


THE GAUNTLET CAST:
POLAND CHALLENGES THE SOVIET UNION

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

THE GAUNTLET CAST:
POLAND CHALLENGES THE SOVIET UNION

by

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The Gauntlet Cast: Poland Challenges the Soviet Union

by

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Captain, United States Army
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June, 1981

ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

In October, 1956, Hungary's communist party revolted. The Soviets intervened twice within the succeeding two weeks, the latter intervention more widely remembered for its bloodiness and its success at quelling the revolt. In January, 1968, Alexander Dubcek became the Czechoslovak Communist Party First Secretary. By March, his reformist trends were evident and in August, only five months later, Soviet tanks rolled into Prague and brought an end to the Prague Spring. In Poland, a severe challenge to the communist system became evident in August 1980. Yet the Soviets have waited ten months to respond to the challenge in a manner similar to those already related. Should intervention be considered probable? Why has military intervention been delayed? When might it finally occur? It is to these questions that this study addresses itself.

Two sagas contribute to the answer. One is of the quest of the Polish nation for expressions of its independence. The other is of the Soviet and Russian nature to expand and maintain control of adjacent areas. While answers to the questions cannot be definitively found without careful

consideration of both stories, this analysis focuses on one, the Soviet/Russian story. Sufficient elements of the other are included as are necessary.

In pursuit, then, of answers to the questions presented, this study first reviews and analyzes the new social and political situation emerging in Poland. It attempts to relate the events which cause the Soviets concern. It also attempts to determine the extent and the depth of the roots of the challenge which is arising in Poland.

Chapter II surveys the historical interaction of the Poles and the Russians. Only with this perspective can an American hope to share with the current Soviet decision-makers a similar Weltanschauung, world perspective. The chapter uncovers the strong continuity of Soviet and Russian attitudes and habits with regard to Poland. It also touches on Polish cultural traits which may continue to cause problems both to their success and to Soviet intervention.

Chapter III then returns to the present and reviews the multitude and variety of stakes which are challenged or affected by the events in Poland. Current Soviet stakes can be classified into one of four groups. The first group are those which threaten subsystem control structures, the second are those which challenge the Soviet model of a

socialist state's political organization, the third, those challenges which directly threaten the Soviet Union, and finally, those competing challenges which are jeopardized by the Polish events.

With the background of the first three chapters, the fourth analyzes the reaction of the Soviets since last August. East European reactions are included for their weight as both inputs into and outputs from the Soviet decision-making apparatus. Specific attention is paid to the early December and latter March time periods when military intervention appeared to be under serious consideration.

Chapter V closes by integrating the first four chapters and by using the insights derived from them to project into the future. Alternatives to intervention, and the nature of the intervention are addressed as well as the ability of the US and the West to affect the Soviet decision.

This study has benefited greatly from the counseling and assistance of Professor Jiri Valenta, Coordinator, Soviet and East European Studies, Department of National Security Affairs, at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr Valenta arranged my interview with Dr Dmitri Simes of Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies whose comments

rendered valuable insight into the nature of the Soviet decision-makers and into their decision-making apparatus. Dr Valenta also enabled me to review portions of my work with Professor Andrzej Korbonski of the Rand Corporation, Dr Robert Conquest, visiting professor at the Hoover Institution, and John Campbell, Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations. I was also greatly aided by my lengthy discussions with a Polish party official who provided an appreciation of both the Polish people and situation as well as the attitudes of one of its party members. Finally, I would like to thank Dr Robert Looney for his advice and assistance which benefited my understanding of the difficulties experienced in the Polish economic development. His jovial banter during the long hours of work were also not unimportant in maintaining the alertness requisite to a study of this nature.

II. Poland 1980-1981

A. SETTING

It is impossible to discuss Soviet reactions in general, or the likelihood of their intervention into Poland specifically, without delving into Polish developments at some length. These developments have received widespread coverage throughout the year and warrant lengthy analysis on their own merits. Such is not, however, the intent of this author. This chapter seeks to paint a selective picture of the details which either cause the Soviets concern or which may affect their reactions. What has happened in Poland to generate Soviet concern? Why has this happened? How has the situation evolved? Why is Poland different from Czechoslovakia?

Today, we are continually assaulted by the news media reports on the labor strife, political disorder, and the economic shortages which are prevailing in Poland. Meat, sugar, milk, and bread are all in short supply, with some rationed. Poland has been called "the international New York City," and in several cases, Western observers have become concerned that massive Soviet intervention was actively

under consideration. However, the Polish problem has been developing for a very long period of time. In 1957, Prof Stanislaw Stomma was elected for the first time to the Polish Sejm (Parliament). In 1960, he authored a manuscript which argued for even closer alliance of Poland and the USSR. But in 1977, he failed to return to the Sejm after he had been reelected. He has since written another book entitled The Tragedies of Polish Reality, in which he argues

There are limits beyond which the realist may not go - when their repeated efforts at compromise find no response from the other side, there is no other way but open resistance.¹

Professor Stomma is not alone in his feelings. Many Poles were generally concerned that an explosion would occur during the late seventies. Jacek Wejroch, an influential member of the Catholic Intelligentsia Club (KIK), has said that "if solidarity had not arisen... we would have met with a civil war."² Seen in this light, the August strikes and the Gdansk agreements are but a small chapter in the recent history of Poland. These strikes did however call the Polish and the Soviet leadership's attention to Poland. They

¹ Adam Bromke, "Czechoslovakia 1968-Poland 1978: A Dilemma for Moscow," International Journal 33 (Autumn 1978): 762.

² Jacek Wejroch, "The Polish Situation from the Viewpoint of the Catholic Intelligentsia," speech given in Polish during January 1981. Translated by Craig Holley.

did this by flagging three Polish trends. The first was to the deterioration of the Polish economy. The second was to the deepening of popular attitudes against the present regime and the organization of their expression of these attitudes. The third was to the weakening of the Party, a weakness that has grown seriously since the August accords. Each of these trends requires deeper understanding because of their central nature to the problem at hand.

B. ECONOMY

Poland has a population of 35 million of whom 19 million are in the labor force. Seventy percent of these work in industry and 26 percent work in private farming.³ Notwithstanding the apparent prominence of the industrial sector, Poland has the "only centrally planned economy which relies on farming."⁴ Polish GNP was the twelfth largest in the world in 1978. In the late seventies, it was the second largest exporter of coal in the world, following immediately behind the United States. Historically, it has also been an

³ Secretariat, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Statistical Yearbook, 1978 (London: IPC Industrial Press, Ltd, 1978), p. 15.

⁴ William J. Newcomb, "Polish Agriculture: Policy, Performance, and Prospects." In Poland, 1980: An East European Country Study, a collection of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress (Washington, D.C.: 1 September 1980), p. 97.

exporter of food. Fifty-five percent of its trade is conducted with East Europe and another 30% with the Soviet Union.⁵ Despite this seemingly healthy background, Poland has major economic problems. Today, estimates of its foreign hard currency debt range between \$24 and \$28 billion. It has also recently become a major importer of agricultural products. What actions contributed to this massive reversal?

1. Historical Summary

Following the German retreat from Poland, and the arrival of the Soviets in 1944, Poland embarked on a new economic road guided by the needs of the Soviet Union. Agricultural prices failed to satisfy the workers demands for food and in 1956, bread riots expressed Polish objections to the course in which the economy was proceeding. The subsequent change in leadership brought Wladislaw Gomulka into power. He halted collectivization of agriculture in an attempt to increase food production. In the latter '50's, economic development slowed throughout Eastern Europe. After a decade of stagnation, many East European countries sought to reform their economies in the

⁵ The Europa Yearbook, 1979 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1979), p. 998.

late '60's. Poland, however, chose to wait until after another set of "bread riots" had forced another leadership change and made Gierek the new First Secretary in 1970.

Briefly surveying the decade of the seventies, internal developments caused changes in policy towards: agriculture and industry in 1970, agriculture in 1973, agriculture and industry in 1976-1977, and are causing changes to both sectors today. Additionally, external developments were of major importance in 1974-1975 and also contributed to the changes in 1976-1977. This hasty overview prepares the reader to examine the policies of the '70's more closely.

Gierek's general objectives in 1970 were to raise living standards and involve the working class in management. Specific objectives of the '71-'75 Five Year Plan (FYP) were to increase exports and satisfy home markets.⁶ He sought to do this by addressing both portions of Poland's economy -- industrial and agricultural.

2. New Development Strategy

In 1970, Poland's economy was burdened by the lack of competitiveness of its industry in foreign markets and by its reliance on agriculture. In an attempt to overcome

⁶ Ibid., pp. 997-998.

these deficiencies, Gierek's "New Development Strategy" (NDS) called for importation of whole new factories from the West. Massive borrowing from the West would finance their purchase and construction. These loans would subsequently be repaid from the additional income generated by exports produced in these same factories. This strategy involves a major gamble, but it is sound from an abstract point of view.⁷ In the years following its adoption, the Polish economy witnessed dramatic growth rates.

However, these very high rates of growth only told part of the story. The Polish planners failed to take into account necessary infrastructure investments. These extremely high rates of growth required an addition to the labor force of at least 100,000 new workers. It also greatly exceeded the capacity of construction and engineering enterprises to process them.⁸ The task was made more difficult because, while the targeting of industries emphasized mechanical engineering, electrical, and chemical sectors, in reality, the targeting was a shotgun approach which caused the rapid diversification to be poorly

⁷ See George R. Feiwel, "Consequences of Excessive Investment Rates," Rivista internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali, 24 (May-June 1977): 492-506.

⁸ Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's." in Poland, 1980, p. 37.

planned.⁹ Complications arose because "investment goods were imported without ensuring an adequate supply of all necessary complementary domestic inputs."¹⁰ These high rates of industrial growth were also incompatible with the increases in national income.

Difficulties were not limited to the ramifications of these high growth rates. Strategy problems also arose. Key to the NDS was an assumption that an excess of exports would result from the adopted measures. However, planners lost control over the imports not only because of the shotgun approach, but also because of the mechanism of "special political linkages, favoritism, and personal contacts."¹¹

Two other criticisms of this strategy can be seen at a broader level of analysis. First, tying in with the foregoing discussion, much of the industry selected for import was materially intensive, and hence, was import intensive. This rendered it very susceptible to the recession which occurred in the West in 1974. Second, these industries, particularly the chemical sector, also tended to

⁹ Gary Teske, "Polish Balance of Payments." in Poland, 1980, p. 87.

¹⁰ Fallenbuchl, p. 38.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 38.

import the energy crises which developed in the West in 1973.

Finally, the NDS required greater flexibility in its administration but there was an absence of the bold reforms necessary to allow this flexibility to be exercised. This deficiency was at the heart of the failure. It underlay many of the preceding criticisms, and it jeopardized the gamble almost from the outset. However, the signs of trouble were not identified and hence could not be addressed for some time.

3. Directions in Farm Policy, 1970

Great attention was also given to agriculture at the beginning of Gierek's tenure. The push to socialize farming, always present in the Eastern Bloc, has met with its stiffest resistance in Poland. By 1970, more than 80% of the agricultural population still worked in private (non-socialized) farms.¹² Policy makers in Poland have routinely experienced the "dilemma that measures to increase private farm output also strengthen the farmer's hold on their land and frustrate the government drive towards socialization."¹³

¹² Secretariat, CMEA, Statistical Yearbook, 1978, p. 15.

¹³ William Newcomb, "Polish Agriculture: Policy, Performance, and Prospects." in Poland, 1980, p. 98.

Gierek answered the question of improving farm output with a series of incentives which included lowering land tax rates, modifying rate structures, abolishing a system whereby coal purchases by farmers were linked to their output (an attempt to link the agricultural sector to the centrally planned economy), and by giving legal title to the land to the farmer who worked it.^{1*} These incentives were successful and the agricultural sector grew significantly in the '71-75 period.

4. Addressing Farm Policy Successes, 1973

But success in these agricultural incentives was apparent as early as 1973, and so the incentives were allowed to deteriorate as planners shifted their sights back towards the long-term goals of socializing agriculture. This emphasis took on the form of acquiring into the socialized sector new farm land from the private sector on a voluntary basis. Farmer profits, which had also experienced rapid growth during the early 70's began to reverse themselves as imports rose in cost more quickly than the value of their products.

The negative impact of planning which aimed at socializing agriculture was multiplied by other factors.

^{1*} Newcomb, p. 104.

First, previously related, were the falling profits of the farmers. Another was the growth of national income which manifested itself in part in higher meat consumption. This growing domestic demand and waning supply combined to created a necessity for a major cutback in the Polish export of meat in 1974. These falling meat exports were followed in 1975 by negative growth in agricultural investment and in 1976, by a reduction in general agricultural output.

The declining health of agriculture following new policies of 1973 and the faltering gamble of the attempts at re-industrialization resulting from bad management, poor strategy, Western inflation and the oil crisis were all prerequisites for the events of 1976.

5. Responding to Agricultural Difficulties

Declining meat production lead to an attempt to increase meat prices in the summer of 1976. These price increases generated great civil disturbances. "Unable, or unwilling to adjust prices and wages,"¹⁵ the government chose to ease the resulting tension by importing beef. These events lead to readoption by the government of the generally pragmatic measures of the early '70's. Government

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 97

intent was to increase food supplies and to encourage farm upkeep while continuing to tie farmers more closely to the state plan.¹⁶ One specific policy eased credit available in an effort to help farmers buy land from the state. The reversal of the trend of adding land to the socialized farm sector was caused by two factors. During the preceding years, land had entered the socialized sector so quickly that it exceeded the absorption capacity of that sector. Much of the land was poor and because of its small size, generally 2-5 hectares, it was not suitable to the application of economies of scale necessary to become productive. Another specific policy promoted construction investments which had fallen after 1975.

But the situation of 1976-1977 differed from that of 1970 in two ways. On this later occasion, expansion of the food available to the consumers preceded the expansion of the supply by the producers and was brought about only by importing the difference. Imports were also increased by the requirement for feed for the domestically produced meat because expansion of these feed supplies had not been emphasized. Both these necessities called into question the success of other policies yet to be related. A second

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 109.

difference of the 1976/1977 period arose because expectations had changed concerning the benefits of expanding production.¹⁷ Frequent reversals in government farm policy caused the farmer to remain distrustful. Hence, their reaction to the new incentives was much less spectacular than it had been in 1970. While production increased, the keys to this period are that the once strong agricultural sector evidenced weakness and now accounted for 30% of all imports from the industrialized West.

6. Modified Economic and Financial System

Problems were not only limited to agriculture. As related, the NDS led to large imports. The factories being imported were not coming on line in time, and the infrastructure and political-economic organization of the country could not meet the demands of this strategy. Therefore, in December, 1976, the industrial development policy was overhauled with adoption of the Modified Economic and Financial System (MEFS). This new policy sought to rationalize imports while expanding exports to balance the foreign trade. But the new policy also marked a return to orthodoxy by limiting the initiative of managers. It instituted the use of indicators, but the indicators were

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 111.

manipulated against one another and failed to reflect significant improvement.¹⁸ However, most significant at the basic level of analysis was its effect on the imports and exports. Imports were arbitrarily restricted, and consequently, new industry, which was import oriented, was choked. Emphasis on exports subsequently reached a level where production of final products was maximized at the expense of the necessary inputs to these same final products, compounding the "choking" problem. The attempt to increase exports and limit imports was ill-planned in the industrial sector and unsupported by the agricultural policy. Compounding all of these problems was the steadily increasing national income which taxed the system with domestic demand.

The Polish government has attributed the poor performance experienced during the period 1977-1979 to four factors.¹⁹ The first two reasons relate to the lack of improvements in Poland's economic infrastructure and are very much present today. They are the energy crisis and transport difficulties. The energy crisis refers to Poland's requirements for power generation which now outstrips its

¹⁸ Fallenbuchl, p. 51.

¹⁹ Communique from the Central Statistics Office, Warsaw, published in Tribuna Ludu, No. 34, 1980, pp. 4-5.

production capacity. During 1980, brownouts and blackouts of industry and private dwellings have become frequent.²⁰ The transportation difficulties are most evident by their de facto limitation of greater Polish coal exports which must be transported from the mines in the south to the Baltic ports in the north. A third difficulty pertains to lack of sufficient supply of materials which has been previously discussed. The final difficulty identified by the government has been a succession of severe winters.

But serious criticism must focus on bad management. Decisions identified as reflecting bad management include pushing development plans during the Western recession; income, pricing, and agricultural policies; the shotgun development approach; and inattention to infrastructure requirements.²¹ Writing under the pen name of Powolny, one Pole has captured the essence of the problem -- "those who must govern do not know how to govern."²² From this background arise the difficulties Poland is experiencing today.

²⁰ Interview with an official of the Polish Communist Party, Monterey, California, 11 December, 1980.

²¹ Teske, pp. 86-89.

²² Antoni Powolny, "Letter from Warsaw." Kultura (Paris), December 1979, cited in Richard T. Davies, "Politico-Economic Dynamics of Eastern Europe: The Polish Case." in Poland, 1980, p. 28.

7. Current Economic State

The close of the '70's has seen the economy in shambles. In 1979, only 60% of the project completion targets were met. Poland's economic planners are currently living a "hand to mouth" existence according to one Western analyst in Warsaw. Investment in industry has been trimmed by \$2.5 billion in an effort to curtail the most capital intensive projects which have long lead times.²³ The success of this attempt represents only a small recovery of a greater loss. The author was told that over \$8 billion of industrial material was lying unused in Poland due to lack of planning for the necessary ancillary requirements. Some of these are as profound as the factory building in which to put the factory.²⁴ Even, at the Katowica foundry, a recently completed project in which the Soviets have great interest, large quantities of equipment valued at \$800 million have been stored in less than ideal circumstances.

The plight of the farmer is not much better. Tractor parts are in extremely short supply. In 1980, only 8,000 of 22,000 required crankshafts were available. Normal maintenance items were also in short supply. Only one-

²³ Christian Science Monitor, 16 October 1980.

²⁴ Interview, 11 December 1980.

quarter of the necessary oil filters, less than half the batteries, and one-third of the tires needed were available.²⁵ Farm production in 1980 was the worst in 20 years. Potato and sugar beet harvests showed 46.8% and 26.7% reductions, respectively.²⁶ A succession of seasons with adverse weather has had its effects, but most of the problems of agriculture arise from the lack of machinery, imported fertilizer, and an abundance of bad planning.

The August strikes have perhaps spurred the country on to new programs with better chances for success, but the August strikes have not been without their costs. East German radio is quick to point out that since the strikes, these costs have included total power cuts on 98 days and partial cuts on another 25 days.²⁷ Iron and steel production have also been significantly reduced. The Polish press has called coal production, which now stands at only two-thirds of normal, a "fullscale collapse of deliveries."²⁸

The strikes have had a positive effect in forcing the government to change. In January, a new economic reform

²⁵ Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1981.

²⁶ Radio Free Europe Research, Situation Report, Poland 3/81 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 18-19 February 1981), p. 6.

²⁷ APN (East Berlin), 9 December 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 10 December 1980, p. E-2.

²⁸ Warsaw Domestic Service, 3 February 1981, in FBIS-EEU, 4 February 1981, p. G-15.

aimed at industry was drafted by the government. This reform called for the introduction of self-government into every factory, decentralization of decision making, with the decisions based on profitability, and finally, it demands a sharp reduction in western imports. Agricultural reform has also been addressed. The government reform seeks to increase funds for agriculture and provides provisions to allow farmers to buy unused state farm land. These changes have only come about as a direct result of the widespread mobilization of the Polish population.

C. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN POLAND

The economic problems are only one facet of the Polish experiment flagged by the August strikes. Economic demands may be the earliest ones expressed because these demands are safer to dispute inside a communist system. Existing political undercurrents only begin to be openly acknowledged after momentum has been gained.²⁹ It is to the political undercurrents, the mobilization of the masses in institutions lying outside the communist party, that we now direct our attention.

²⁹ J.M. Montias, "Economic Conditions and Political Instability in Communist Countries: Observations on Strikes, Riots, and Other Disturbances," Studies in Comparative Communism 13 (Winter 1980): 287.

1. Catholic Church

Roots for the political mobilization of Poland have long been present in the form of the Catholic Church. In the words of one Polish communist party official, "the Church has for a thousand years been aligned with the people. It is part of the people, part of Poland's history. It cannot be crushed under foot."³⁰ Its role as a separate political force within Poland has grown since the communists came to power, although its political role is carefully muted. Its contribution to the current situation, which has been the subject of much dispute, can be largely cleared up if the significance of the Church is analyzed from two perspectives. The first is from the perspective of the role of its leadership and the second is through the profound impact it has as a separate organization which provides a counter ideology and has a following of 30 million adherents in a state of 35 million people.

During much of Poland's post war history, the Church leadership has largely acted in alliance with the state. After winning sufficient reforms to maintain its own existence, it has chosen to remain a predominantly passive

³⁰ "Hitherto in Poland We Have Suffered Not from Socialism But from Too Little Socialism," L'Unita (Milan), 10 September 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 16 Sept 1980, p. G-16.

actor. This is not a surprising pattern of activity for the institution responsible for the preservation of the Polish nationhood throughout 200 years of Russian and Soviet occupation. It is the behaviour one would expect of a survivor who views his existence and impact in the long-term to be more important than his impact on the short-term problems.

Since last summer, the Church, working in various manners, has broken this general policy and intervened in short-term events four times. The first was in August when it called for a return to work; the second was in early November, when difficulties over Solidarity's registration occurred; the third was in early December, during the period of tension, nationwide strikes, and widespread concern for the strong possibility of Soviet intervention; and the fourth was at the end of the Bielska-Biala strikes in early February. However, public doubt of the leadership has been raised by the consistent calls for moderation. The leadership has responded to the government request on three occasions while only once being responsive to the request of a non-government representative.³¹

³¹ Lech Walesa asked for the Primate to support the peasants on February 6 1981. This support was given speedily and was important in bringing about a solution to the Bielsko-Biala strikes that same day.

Notwithstanding the attitudes of the populace, the party has the perception that the Church leadership exercises great power and it has, therefore, attempted to harness this power. In one instance in September, Church appeals were given major air time in the government controlled media. But there is clear evidence of the questionable nature of this power. The appeals of Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski which were used were aimed at women because the men were no longer listening.³² The death of the Primate in May, 1981, can only serve to further weaken the Church leadership's influence over short-term events which is already more valued than valuable because of the popular perception that it has acted in alliance with the government.

If the impact of the Church leadership has been somewhat limited, the impact of the existence of the Church has been much more profound. It has been noted that the Church provides an idiom, a language, for the expression of a challenge to the socialist system. The political essence of the Church has been aptly described by a communist political scientist as being a "perpetually competitive

³² "Still Worries for the Future," Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), 11 September 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 11 September 1980, p. G-14.

ideological force juxtaposed between the party and the state."³³

The Church's importance in this devoutly Catholic nation has increased in the last several years, especially since the elevation of Karol Wojtyla to the Papacy. His rise sparked renewed interest within the country and increased the average Pole's national pride. Even Solidarity's leader, Lech Walesa has remarked that the Pope's visit to Poland in June 1979 played a role in the preparation of Poland for the current events.³⁴ One form of this preparation came through the use of a new organization for crowd control during his visit. This was a Catholic militia, separate from the government and the party, numbering 40,000 monitors.³⁵ Its success was demonstrated by the absence of a single reported breach of order and its value was derived from the organizational experience which it gained.³⁶

³³ Jan B. de Weydenthal, Poland: Communism Adrift, The Washington Papers, No. 72 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1979), p. 65.

³⁴ "Lech Walesa: I'm a Worker for Heaven's Sake!", Le Monde (Paris), 14-15 September 1980, p. 3, in FBIIS-EEU, 16 September 1980, p. G-22.

³⁵ Christian Science Monitor, 10 March 1981.

³⁶ Interview, 11 December 1980.

Thus, the Church has provided one of the main keys to the the population's ability to face up to, deal with, and express their sentiments about the problems within their society. While its day to day control over events is probably limited, its importance comes through its existence, the idiom it provides, and the pride it has encouraged.

2. Solidarity

Two other actors are much newer and more profound in their short-term impact. The first is the Solidarity trade union. It is ironic to reflect that East Europe's first communist politicians arose not within the communist party where they may have been expected, but from the working class so highly touted by Marx (but later discredited by Lenin). Jozef Pinkowski, a former Polish Prime Minister, has written that the Solidarity trade union movement was "born of the will and the hope of the working class."³⁷ Today it encompasses approximately ten million people, including one-third of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP, the official name of the Polish Communist Party). Solidarity started publishing Jednosc in December with a circulation of one

³⁷ Warsaw Domestic Service, 24 November 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 26 November 1980, p. G-14.

hundred thousand, and in February, it received permission to expand publication of this weekly six-fold and to open eight regional papers. The legislated right to exist, married with the approval of these publications, reflects a revolutionary change because this potential power has been delegated to another part of the society not directly controlled by the communist party.

The impact of this organization would not be so profound without its unique leader, Lech Walesa. He is a politically savvy ex-electrician who gained earlier experience during the disturbances of June 1970. He is also a moderate. There is some evidence that he was prepared to accept a resolution to the August strikes on the sixteenth, two weeks before the final resolution, and with only minor gains won.³⁸ Walesa's contribution to Solidarity is his ability to mold a union consensus which first springs from a large unruly group which holds widely diverging ideas and which, second, diverges from the established political norm significantly, but thus far not tragically. "Everyone knows

³⁸ Studium News Abstracts, No.4, October 1980. This report may also have been a government disinformation exercise. Other evidence of his moderate position comes from interview such as one broadcast on the Warsaw International Service, 18 November 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 20 November 1980, p. G-3.

that he is essential for the movement's homogeneity.³⁹ It is unclear whether one final anecdote is true or not. A member of the Polish Catholic intelligentsia, while travelling in the United States recently, related that two of Walesa's children are orphans of workers killed during the 1970 riots.⁴⁰ True or not, this story serves to highlight the popular support Walesa enjoys.

Solidarity has several difficulties. Growing from a foundation which was laid in the years preceding the strikes, Solidarity has a very weak central organization. Its National Consultative Commission has at times evidenced very little control over the members of the union. Because of this loose organization, it is also highly susceptible to the influences of internal politics. Some of the most serious strikes, occurring in January over work-free Saturdays, were called by Walesa's subordinate, Zbigniew Bujak, while Walesa was in Italy visiting the Pope. It was known that Bujak was dissatisfied at not being included in Walesa's entourage to see the Pope.⁴¹ Solidarity's final problem today stems from its quick growth. This has limited

³⁹ "Warsaw Threatened a State of Siege," De Volkskrant (Amsterdam), 7 April 1981, p. 4, in FBIS-EEU, 10 April 1981, p. G-21.

⁴⁰ Speech, January 1981.

⁴¹ New York Times, 17 January 1981.

its control over its own grass roots. Mass psychology was very evident in February when it almost overcame the strict discipline which has marked the movement from its birth and which has contributed so directly to its successes thus far.

Why has Solidarity, a loosely organized and controlled organization succeeded? General agreement on an explanation exists. It includes nationalism, the existence of the Polish Church, the illegal cells of dissidents, the underground press, and one specific dissident group, the KOR. Attention is now turned to these last three elements.

3. Dissidents

Much of Solidarity's success is firmly based on the emergence, in Poland, of a variety of dissident groups following the disturbances of June, 1976. The seeds for this emergence had been sown during the "March Events" of 1968 when the intellectuals and students clashed with the government over a question of censorship. In reality, this clash was over the government tendency to act in a haphazard and authoritarian manner in areas which were beginning to be popularly felt to lie outside thier jurisdiction. Three days of rioting and three weeks of sit-ins on Polish universities in that month were complimented by the young Prague Spring blossoming to the south. But both the March 1968 and summer

1970 riots over meat price increases failed to see a coalition between the workers and the intellectuals which was strong enough to stand long in defiance of the system.

The Polish dissident movement has been distinguished by three qualities. The first is autonomy; they are totally separate from the party. The second is openness; the earliest group declared its formation in an open letter to the Sejm. Their third quality was their maintenance of international ties in Eastern and Western Europe as well as in the Soviet Union itself.^{*2} Although the many groups which arose since 1976 share this general qualities, they are not all alike. One group, the Movement for Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) largely adopted the "political traditions of the interwar period."^{*3} The Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), lead by Leszek Moczulski, was a firebrand organization whose goal was a radical reorientation of Poland within the international system, following its complete break with the Soviet Union.

As has been implied, the first and most important dissident group is KOR, the Committee for the Defense of Workers. It was formed in September, 1976 and renamed the -----

^{*2} Poland: Communism Adrift, pp. 53-61.

^{*3} Adam Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," Problems in Communism, September-October 1978, p. 42.

Committee of Social Self Defense (KSS) one year later. It used its limited funds to press human rights charges on the government when they detained workers. Its leader is Jacek Kuron, who is today one of the most vilified Poles in the Soviet and East European press. In Western eyes, Kuron appears to be moderate. He has been quoted as saying that he is "unambiguously on the side of compromise."⁴⁴ But, to the Soviets, he is more radical. His vision for Poland's future international position is of another Finland.

After 1976, he took on the task of organizing future events so that they could lead to success rather than failures as had been witnessed in 1956, 1970, and 1976. Paraphrasing Lenin's famous question, what is to be done, Kuron asked, what should we do. His answer was to call for the organization of a multitude of movements which would be individually incapable of success but which would have sufficient unity between them to render their collective demands indisputable. He specifically envisioned movements of the Church, the workers, the peasants, and the writers, artists, and scholars.⁴⁵ It is this loose organization that is manifested in Solidarity's loose central organizing

⁴⁴ New Statesman (London), 3 December 1980.

⁴⁵ Jacek Kuron, "Reflections on a Program of Action," The Polish Review 22 (No. 3 1977): 63.

committee. This collective orientation was clearly evidenced when, after Solidarity's registration, it lent its assistance to the farmers in their quest to gain their own union - Rural Solidarity.

From the tactical perspective, Kuron argued that the first requirement must be to break the state monopoly on communication. In pursuit of this goal, by 1979, there were twenty to thirty underground periodicals printing a wide variety of material, including political treatises and literary works. One clandestine publishing house was named Nova. In three years, it published 115 books while using five tons of paper each month! An operation of this magnitude could not succeed without tremendous organization, influence, and the tolerance of the Geirek regime. Shedding further light on these last observations is the acknowledgement that the President of the Polish Academy of Sciences was one of fifty reviewers of a recent book.*

Another interesting element in the dissident movement which arose was the organization of the Flying University. This organization took its name from a similar organization which existed prior to 1914 during another

* "The Silent Printing Presses," L'Express (Paris), 10 January 1981, p. 49-50, in FBIS-EEU, 14 January 1981, Annex.

period of Russian subjugation. By the spring of 1978 it had acquired a semi-institutionalized form and taken the name of the Association of Educational Courses (TKN). The University specialized in teaching courses that the communist system could not allow because of content or slant, such as Polish history.

The dissidents played a major role in the July and August strikes. The most important periodical published by the dissidents was the KOR publication Rabotnik, (The Worker). It attempted to forge ties with the workers and it was apparently very successful. At the time of the strikes, Rabotnik was in circulation of 27,000 to 35,000 copies and each copy was read by many people. It was used to list other strikes occurring throughout Poland and to give advice on how to conduct a successful strike. Kuron's home was used as a clearing house for strike information. In recognition of KOR's influence one Politburo member dubbed the factory strike committees "KOR-Mafia." Rabotnik's effectiveness was also witnessed by the increased success of the strikes in locations where it had the greatest circulation. KOR's success in breaking the government monopoly on communication must be assessed as its greatest contribution to the success of the strikes.

However, since the conclusion of the strikes, the role of the dissidents has been much more muted. Today they serve in reduced numbers as behind the scenes advisors and strategists for Solidarity, and their guidance must be tempered by the will of the workers.

4. Students

Brief mention should be made of yet another group. In the middle of February, the Polish government made concessions to the students. These concessions provided for the end of compulsory courses in Marxism and the Russian language. The absence of these compulsory courses is a serious change because it strikes a major element of the Soviets' attempt to inculcate their system in Poland and is magnified because of the role these students will later play in the Polish society. The students also won the legal right to form a union in these February agreements.

5. Farmers

Farmers habitually face greater difficulties in organizing themselves than do their industrial compatriots. Thus it is not surprising to find that their efforts to register an agricultural union have been slower. While they can trace their origins to a meeting in September 1978 in

the village of Lisow,⁴⁷ their renewed attempts did not begin until October or become serious until after the new year. Their tactics were generally similar to those used by Solidarity earlier in the year. When initial attempts to register were turned down by court ruling, which must certainly have reflected Party disapproval, the farmers resorted to protest actions. Within agriculture, these are more dangerous than those in industry because of the short 'windows' for planting and the long lead times required to restore slaughtered livestock holdings.⁴⁸ As serious as the protest actions could be, the government hesitated to allow formation of this union. One explanation, which probably reflects more deep-seated fear than a rational assessment, notes that the Church is the strongest force among the peasantry, while the Party is weakest among them. Perhaps in recognition of this fear, and in a notable break with Solidarity, the proposed charter of the Rural Solidarity took occasion to unequivocally recognize the PUWP as the country's leading force.

Despite the Party's reservations, and in light of the dire need of the country to improve its agriculture and

⁴⁷ Christian Science Monitor, 3 April 1981.

⁴⁸ Evidence that the protest was taking this form was given on PBS, MacNeil-Lehrer Report, 13 February 1981.

avoid compounding the already serious economic conditions, Rural Solidarity was recognized on 16 April of this year. While it only claims to represent one-third of the farmers of the country,⁴⁹ it represents unionization of the last major element of the Polish society in a non-Communist organ. Students, laborers, professionals, and farmers have all forced major reforms in their respective areas.

D. THE POLISH UNITED WORKER'S PARTY (PUWP)

While the dissidents provided the key to the organization which proved so successful during the August strikes, the PUWP has given evidence of all that is bad in Poland today. It has few politicians and few leaders. Not only is its organization weak, but even its legitimacy has been directly questioned. Kuron has written that it has no legitimacy, that its apparatus "is disgusted at the leadership" which is "afraid of the masses and incapable of making decisions."⁵⁰ This is perhaps the most succinct evaluation that has been made of the PUWP as it existed prior to the new year.

⁴⁹ Christian Science Monitor, 3 April 1981.

⁵⁰ "FRG Paper Publishes Article by Polish Dissident," Die Welt (Bonn), 18 August 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 18 August 1980, p. G-27.

The PUWP got itself into its present predicament by refusing to reform during the seventies when reform was necessary. Evidence of this was given during the previous discussion of the economy. One analyst characterized its aims during the decade of the '70's when he observed that it sought to "preserve and strengthen the traditional heirarchical principles of power and control on which the system rested."⁵¹

From an analytical viewpoint, its present predicament is evidenced by three features which cause alarm. The first is the loss of initiative at the top. It has been shocked by the events which have transpired and has been unable, through April, to regain the initiative. This loss is also the result of a leadership divided by sharp differences, and will be addressed below. The second is obstruction of middle echelon members of the party (regional party secretaries and officials on city committees) who have been targeted for their incompetence by the attacks of the population. Since the August strikes, thirty regional party secretaries, over one-half of all those in Poland, and 80% of the officials on city committees have been replaced.⁵²

⁵¹ Poland: Communism Adrift, p. 14.

⁵² Wall Street Journal, 28 May 1981.

The third feature is the push by a clear majority of the rank and file for the reform which the middle echelon resists and over which the leadership is divided.⁵³ In the middle of February, party members were reported to be coming to the conclusion that the reform process was illusory. Party dissarray was noted in

repeated and widespread attempts by both local party officials and segments of its rank and file to develop views and undertake actions contrary to the instructions of the central leadership.⁵⁴

Its weakness was also evidenced in its continual and routine losses to Solidarity, by its appointment of Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski to the post of Premier in the middle of February, and by its appointment of the first Catholic, Jerzy Ozdowski, to the Sejm in November. These difficulties have lead the party to a new and dangerous fracturing and loss of control. A mid-April decision taken by the Wroclaw party organization was unprecedented. It decided to elect its delegates to the upcoming Party Congress by secret ballot. This decision has since been adopted by other regional organizations.

⁵³ Christian Science Monitor has reported this majority to be 80% of the rank and file. 20 April 1981.

⁵⁴ Jan B. de Weydenthal, Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report 301/80 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 16 December 1980).

The move to secret ballot (free) election of Party Congress delegates is only the first radical departure from the orthodox Soviet political model. Another change strikes at the heart of Leninist dogma. Democratic centralism, verticle communication from higher to lower, has been challenged with new horizontal linkages as reformist trends in one region spread throughout the country without the approval or guidance of the senior party leadership and as party groups of varicus orders in the hierarchical chain intermingle with each other. This gives clear evidence of the severity of the situation in the party today.

The PUWP has been characterized as having both moderates and hardliners. While this is an over simplification which fails to highlight the nuances of the present situation, it does render its essence. Generally the hardliners are for a centralized economic plan, tougher measures towards the opposition, and a rather conservative ideology on party affairs and internal security. The moderates favor economic decentralization and expansion of the cultural and religious freedoms and more consultation with the workers. The hardliners and moderates have been contesting control of the Politburo since August. The moderates have the support of the population while the hardliners have that of Moscow.

Since August, positions of the principle actors have cleared. Today, the hardliners, who lean somewhat left of center, are Stefan Olszowski and Tadeusz Grabski while the moderates, leaning slightly to the right of center are Tadeusz Fiszbach and Kazimierz Barcikowski. Stanislaw Kania and Wojciech Jaruzelski sit in the center. Thus far, a standoff has resulted. But the balance should not be expected to continue after the meeting of the Party Congress, scheduled for 14-18 July, 1981, when reforms will undoubtedly be ratified and in which many, if not all, of these people could fail to win reelection. Until that time, it appears that the party will continue to be driven by dissension from rank and file wishing reform, stymied by the middle echelons seeking to preserve their jobs, and capped by a divided leadership.

Jaruzelski holds out the hope for some improvement in the future viability of the government. Of him, Walesa has said, "I had never before seen a member of the Government make decisions. We have never had a Premier who justified so much hope."⁵⁵ He has restored the post of Premier to a position of power not previously seen. This is because of

⁵⁵ "Walesa: I Want to Leave Solidarity," France-Soir (Paris), 8 April 1981, pp. 1,4, in FBIS-EEU, 9 April 1981, p. G-15.

his unique combination of his positions as Premier, Defense Minister, and Politburo member. He is on a first name basis with senior Soviet military officers and is considered a patriot who would not welcome outside intervention. He is also extremely hesitant to use force. He rose through the ranks of the military by remaining uninvolved in the factional politics which regularly removed his superiors. In the quest for illuminating analogies one French writer has called Jaruzelski "the Polish Alexander Haig."⁵⁶ Committed to reform and a political solution to the crisis, Jaruzelski is indeed important to the unfolding crisis.

While factional disputes within the party are deep and dangerous, it has so far successfully avoided allowing Soviet intervention. It is possible that this has been accomplished by being firm in the face of the Soviets during their numerous conversations. Evidence that this firmness is present within the leadership, certainly Stanislaw Kania, the PUWP First Secretary, is given by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs who, after a visit to Poland on December 6, related that he was "impressed with the insistence with

⁵⁶ Although unspecified, this analogy is most applicable if it is made of Haig during the Watergate period.

which the Polish leaders affirmed that they have the will and capacity to solve the problems by themselves. "57

Each of the major daily actors has now been addressed. However, discussion of those elements of the Polish situation which give rise to Soviet concern or figure in the calculations of alternatives is incomplete without attending to the role of the Polish military.

E. POLISH MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

Two organizations in Poland are equiped and organized for fighting. The first, the militia, is composed of tough well-trained security forces. The second, the military, is made up of conscripts. The Polish army is today the largest and in many respects the most modern of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) armies. It has five tank divisions and eight motorized rifle divisions. It is unique among the NSWP armies in that it also has one airborne and one amphibious division. In 1972, 81% of the army's officers came from worker and peasant families.

57 "Foreign Minister Comments on Polish Situation," Brussels in French to Africa, 6 December 1980, in FBIS-WE, 9 December 1980, p. Z-1.

"The Polish military has today partially revived its traditional ethos as the guardian of the Polish nation."⁵⁸ One reflection of this is the combined celebration on 29 November, of the anniversary of the 1830 revolt against the Russians and Polish Officer's Cadets Day.⁵⁹

The military can theoretically perform two direct roles in crises situations. One is in maintaining or restoring domestic order and the other is in countering external threats. The role of the military in maintaining or restoring domestic order, through the active use of troops, must be regarded as unlikely. The Army disobeyed orders to fire during the 1956 Poznan riots and was used only in a limited fashion to break up strikes in 1970. Jaruzelski has claimed that this latter action was only conducted after "uncoordinated orders" were issued.⁶⁰ Furthermore, their use in 1970 compounded serious soul-searching within the armed forces which arose after their participation in the Czech invasion in 1968. Even the Soviets commented on their invasion attitudes which they criticized as being marked by

⁵⁸ A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier, R-2417/1-AF/PP, (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1980), p. v.

⁵⁹ Warsaw Domestic Service, 29 November 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 5 December 1980, p. 3-30.

⁶⁰ East European Military Establishments, p. 60.

"passivity" and "lack of committment" to the goals of the invasion.⁶¹ This was even more striking because it disputed the traditional animosities which exist between the Poles and the Czechs. The nature of the resolution of this debate was signalled in 1976, when it is widely believed that Jaruzelski cautioned that "Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers."⁶² The likelihood that the security forces would be used for internal control is higher by their nature and history, but lower in reality. They number only 77,000 and their regular units were unable to handle riots in 1956 or 1970. Furthermore, their demorilization today is of such serious dimensions that questions of their effectiveness must be raised. It is therefore unlikely that they will be able to play a major role in the current crisis either.

Turning to the role of both the military and the security forces in responding to an external threat, one finds a different picture. As would be expected, both have been generally neutralized by the presence of Soviet officers and advisors. However, on occasion, elements of the Army and security forces have been succeeded in acting with

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 60.

⁶² Dale Herspring, "The Polish Military and the Policy Process," in Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, eds., Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Poland, Boulder, Westview, 1980, cited in East European Military Establishments, p. 61.

independence. In October 1956, when one Soviet division stationed in Poland began moving towards Warsaw, elements of the Polish security forces were moved into positions around Warsaw to block Soviet access,⁶³ clearly threatening armed resistance.

During the current crisis, it has been reported that Polish military units took up positions near one Soviet division at Wroclaw in a move reminiscent to that of the security forces in 1956.⁶⁴ They participated in the Brotherhood-in-Arms exercise in September 1980 only in reduced numbers and when the Soviet amphibious units were employed, the Polish ones were not exercised at all. This lends interesting evidence to the sensitivity of the Soviets to the role of the Polish armed forces in a possible future intervention. Use of the security forces in October, 1956 was a result of the commanders' allegiance to the Polish government and their ability to thwart the Soviet advisors. One should not, therefore, discount their potential for future use in this role either.

The current orientation of the military commanders has been made clear in a variety of ways. In one statement, the

⁶³ East European Military Establishments, p. 23.

⁶⁴ Newsweek, 29 September 1980, p. 36.

military leaders noted that they favored "the bilateral and unequivocal implementation" of the August agreements.⁶⁵ In a statement that was yet stronger, 50 generals and 200 staff officers said that "Poland's military chiefs are secretly pledged to fight with their people against any invading communist army."⁶⁶ The great extent of the integration of the military leadership with that of the PUWP has also been reported.⁶⁷ Thus, with their recent emphasis in the officer's corps on professional military criteria over political preparation, and the general de-Sovietization that has occurred since Gomulka's rise in 1956, their role in countering a future intervention into Poland must not be discounted.

F. REVIEW

This chapter has demonstrated the great economic instability in the country and the economic calamity facing that nation, the unity, organization and vocal nature of the opposition which has emerged in Poland, and the weakness of the adherents to that system, the PUWP. One last comment

⁶⁵ Warsaw Domestic Television, 29 November 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 29 November 1980, p. G-11.

⁶⁶ Daily Express (London), 3 December 1980.

⁶⁷ "If the USSR Intervened in Poland, its Intervention Would Be 'Lawful'," Le Soir (Brussels), 6 December 1980, p. 2, in FBIS-EEU, 10 December 1980, p. G-2.

must be made. Until the new year, the Polish crisis was marked by being distinctly different from the cases of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In both of these latter two cases, the Communist party was in the forefront of the reform movement, rather than being dragged along as is true in the Polish case. Unlike Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the calls for reform in Poland were issued from outside of the PUPP and were much more broadly based than the earlier calls. However, recently, and certainly since February, a breakdown within the party has become apparent and has affected a dramatic change. This may portend the most serious omen yet against the continuation of the Polish experiment beyond the next few months. Strong arguments have been made that in the past the issue at stake in East European interventions has always been control of the local communist party.⁶⁶ It is this control which seems to be in jeopardy today.

⁶⁶ Jiri Pelikan, The Secret Vysocany Congress (London: Penguin Press, 1971), p. 282, cited in Christopher Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe," World Politics 29 (January 1977): 231.

III. HISTORICAL THREADS

Today, much of the world is wondering whether Poland's current difficulties will trigger a Soviet response similar to their interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The question is very complex and there are a variety of avenues open which may provide answers to it. Basic to, and early in, any discussion of Soviet intervention must be one question. What is Poland to the Soviet Union?

Chekov, the nineteenth century Russian playwright, once wrote that the past "weighs upon a Russian mind like a thousand-ton rock." With this in mind, it appears important for the non-Russian observer to have an appreciation for past Russian experiences. If Chekov is right, this can render a glimpse of reactions and predispositions of the current Soviet decision makers. What follows, therefore, is a review of Soviet-Polish history which attempts to illuminate the attitudes which the Soviets maintain of the Poles, and the nature of the historic interaction. Additionally, some attention will be paid to drawing a sketch of the Polish political culture.

A. POLISH VITALITY

Ironically, the conversion, by Catholic priests, of Poland's first historical ruler, Mieszko I to Christianity in 963 A.D. establishes the beginning of both the official Polish history and the deep-rooted cultural conflict which marks Poland's historic relationship with Russia. The history of Poland since that date can be broken down into two periods. During the first, which ended in 1697, Poland was an important international actor. Copernicus, studying at the University of Krakow, is today's most familiar example of the heights to which Polish culture rose in the golden age it experienced during the Jagiellonian Dynasty (1368-1572). Poland's importance in the politico-military arena is also clearly revealed by the role it played in the relief of Vienna (1683), when Polish cavalry, operating in a coalition army under the leadership of Sobieski (King John III of Poland) defended the city and halted the advance of the Turks into western central Europe.

The interplay between Russia and Poland for influence and control had already begun during this first period when Poland extended its boundaries west and south to include the lands of historic Lithuania, modern Byelorussia and the Ukraine, and the city of Kiev. The climax of this interplay

occurred in 1610 when Sigismund II's Polish armies capitalized on Russia's Time of Troubles and occupied Moscow in support of the Thief, the Second Pretender to the Throne of Muscovy.⁶⁹ This event marked the nadir of Russian power. The Polish occupation of the Kremlin ended in November 1612. While Polish conversion to Catholicism marked the beginning of the contest for influence, the occupation of Moscow shaded it with deep emotion.

As is frequently the case, seeds for change are sown long before the change they induce becomes evident. The Polish prestige and influence evidenced during the relief of Vienna in 1683 were undermined by a change made in 1572. In that year, the last Jagiellonian king died leaving no heir. The Polish response to this crisis was to invoke a Constitution whose major article made the monarchy an elective office. Unique among its European neighbors, these changes opened the Kingdom to outside interference both during succession crises and during the intervening years when the now successful candidates catered to their foreign benefactors.

⁶⁹ In an interesting aside, Dmitri the False drew from the Poles not only his support, but also his heritage.

This change arose directly from internal politics. The szlachta, the Polish gentry, having fallen under the spell of the Western ideas of liberty and freedom preserved these for themselves by severely limiting the power of the king. They further limited his power with another major provision, called the liberum veto which allowed any single deputy in the Sejm to veto any bill passed in that body. These are early examples of a general Polish cultural trait of intense, almost fierce, individualism. Clarifying the ramifications of this trait, one observer has noted that Polish individualism has been a serious impediment to their efforts

to establish the institutions which, when they function, assure the state a firm base of political and economic concord that permits it to exercise its sovereignty to the limits of strength and opportunity.⁷⁰

Several themes important to this study are already evident in the first period of Poland's history. One was the Catholicization of Poland. This event served to philosophically separate the Polish Slavs from the Russian Slavs who maintained their Orthodoxy with its Byzantine heritage. Catholicization may also have provided Poland with the urge to convert the Orthodox populations to the East.

⁷⁰ Clifford R. Barnett, Poland: Its People, its Society, its Culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1958), p. 1.

Another theme results from the occupation of Moscow (1610-1611). Accomplished during a period of extreme Russian weakness, this event set the tone of the struggle at a basic level. A final theme relates to the constraints which the Polish culture was placing on its own political viability.

B. RUSSIAN ASCENDANCE

Russian recovery from and response to the 1610/1611 occupation was short in developing and leads to the second period of Polish history, one which reveals a fragmented, weak, and divided Poland progressively falling under the power of Russia. During the first Northern War (1654-1667), Poland was unable to defend its own borders. Rising Russian strength lead in 1667 to the Treaty of Andrusovo which divided the previously exclusively Polish Ukraine with Russia. During the Great Northern War(1700-1721), further trends in Polish culture and in Russo-Polish relations became evident. During the later seventeenth century, the Polish political situation was "chaotic." Poland was headed "toward political disintegration and anarchy." It was, with a population of eight million, an "impotent giant." A contemporary English diplomat described Poland. "This unsettled nation [is] like the sea, it foams and

roars...[but it] only moves when it is agitated by some superior power."⁷¹ Russia, occupied by Poland only ninety years earlier, did not fail to capitalize on its new found strength. Growing Russian preeminence over Poland resulted not only from Russia's success at battle with the Swedes during the Great Northern War, but also because Peter's agents "learned to exploit the Polish Constitution and to play the nobility against each other and the king."⁷² This is only the first of many curious examples revealing the continuity of the patterns of interaction which have marked these two countries for the last 350 years.

Political weaknesses, arising from the Polish political culture continued to undermine the nation's strength. While Russia's influence in Poland in the eighteenth century was limited by its de facto nature, Polish political viability was limited by its "wretched system of government." One historian has written that "the triumphant class (the szlachta) failed to organize its power in such a manner as to give the country an effective government." But his most enlightening description depicted the nation living "in

⁷¹ Collection of the Imperial Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1884-1898, XXXIX, 222, cited by Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 228.

⁷² Warren B. Walsh, Russia and the Soviet Union (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 127.

anarchy thinly concealed under the forms of an elaborate republican Constitution."⁷³ These observations were also shared by contemporary Russians. In 1762, one wrote

Poland is constantly being plunged into internal discord and disorders which take up her whole attention; as long as she preserves her Constitution she does not deserve to be considered among the European Powers.⁷⁴

C. CATHERINE AND THE PARTITIONS

Into this milieu entered Russia's Catherine the Great. Her interest in Poland had far reaching importance. Her first major act was to influence the election of Poland's new King in 1763. Her preference was for Stanislaw Poniatowski; it was a preference based on his loyalty to her - indubitably proven during their earlier romantic association. Her tactics to secure the election involved an early, although by no means unparalleled, use of Russian troops. Encamped around Warsaw during the election, the psychological impact of their presence was sufficient to secure Catherine's choice.

⁷³ M. Bobrzynski, Dzieje Polski w zarysie, 3 vols. (Cracow, 1890), 2:353, cited by Robert H. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), p. 7. Emphasis added.

⁷⁴ Letter from Chancellor M.V. Vorontsov to Peter III, cited by N.D. Chechulin, Vneshnaia politika Rossii v nachale tsarstvovaniia Ekateriny II, p. 208, cited by Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 5.

The next few years proved quiet, but the Russian quest for greater influence continued. In 1767, a major confrontation over the severely limited rights of those members of the Polish population who were Orthodox or Protestant was engineered by Prince Nicholai Repnin, the Russian Ambassador to Poland. A sound Russian purpose existed for this choice. In a note to Repnin, Nikita Panin, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was considered to be Catherine's mouthpiece,⁷⁵ wrote

It is necessary to resolve the Dissident affair not for the sake of propagating our faith and the Protestants in Poland, but for the sake of acquiring for ourselves, through our correlative religionists and the Protestants, a firm and reliable party with the legal right to participate in all the affairs of Poland.⁷⁶

During the campaign for Dissident rights, Repnin was "in every respect absolute monarch."⁷⁷ Again the pattern of interaction reveals its curious continuity. Repnin wrote "I will place 15,000 troops at the Diet, and the Diet will be compelled to do what the Dissidents demand with the

⁷⁵ Lord, The Second Partition, p. 47.

⁷⁶ Letter from Panin to Repnin cited by Sergei Mikhailovich Solov'ev, Istoria Rossii s drayneishikh vremen, XXVII, 482-483 (25 August 1767), cited by Kaplan, the First Partition, p. 67. (emphasis added)

⁷⁷ Third Earl of Malmesbury, ed., Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury, I:11-12, cited by Ibid., p. 84.

protection of the Empress."⁷⁸ To ensure favorable votes, uncompromising Poles were placed under house arrest. Despite these measures, the initial attempts to secure these Dissident rights eluded Catherine's subordinates.

However, this situation was reversed when Repnin proposed that Catherine be proclaimed the guarantor of the Polish Constitution. Poles who were intransigent to this new idea, including the Bishops of Krakow and Kiev, were ordered arrested and imprisoned by the Russian Ambassador. Without these strong opponents of Dissident reform, the remaining Poles acquiesced to the demand that Catherine be made the guarantor of their Constitution, which was thereupon amended to provide for the rights of the Dissidents.

This important period of Russian interaction with the Poles was not yet complete. In response to Russia's interference in Poland, a patriotic uprising occurred under the leadership of the Bar Confederation. Typical of many future Polish attempts to throw off Russian dominance, the Confederation was strongly patriotic but weakly organized. While considering support of the Bar Confederation, the

⁷⁸ Wladyslaw, Kono pczynski, Kazimierz Pulaski, zyciorys, p. 16, cited by Ibid., p. 81.

French wondered if it was "one of those ephemeral movements to which Polish flightiness is given." The French emissary from Louis XV, travelling in cognito, confirmed the suspicion. It is easy to confuse whether he was talking of historic or contemporary Poland. He found it in a "state of confusion, dissension, ignorance, and disorder."⁷⁹ Further evidence of the Confederation's weak organization came in June 1768 when Russian troops crushed it one day before a major element in Krakow joined the Confederation. Polish defeat after four more years of warfare which sometimes was fought with guerilla tactics, lead to the First Partition of Poland in 1772.

1. The First Partition

The First Partition was conducted in concert with Prussia and Austro-Hungary and saw limited areas on the perimeter absorbed by the outside powers. Catherine explained her actions during this period by invoking calls for the return of "Russian lands" and the repatriation of ethnic Russians, but these explanations were lame. The subjects of Catherine's interest were the population of modern Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Unlike today, however, during the eighteenth century, the former were referred to

⁷⁹ Ibid., 97.

as Lithuanians and the latter as the Cherkassian nation.⁸⁰ This clearly exposed Russian acceptance of the population's non-Russian characters. Catherine's interest was far more accurately explained by self-defense and acquisition of a passage to Europe. But with the Partition, Russia had traded de facto influence throughout the whole Polish Commonwealth for de jure control of only a small part. Clearly, Catherine's goals had not yet been satisfied.

2. The Second Partition

A new chapter opened shortly after the French Revolution in 1789 when, in 1791, the Poles adopted a progressive and more liberal Constitution. The liberalization lead in 1792 to the Targowica Confederation, to whom the king, still Poniatowski, turned over control of the state. The Confederation failed to be effective, and Russia's expansive attitudes saw opportunity. One Russian diplomat noted in late 1792, that "this nation [has] shown itself so hopelessly perverse that it must be reduced to a state of perpetual impotence to harm its neighbors." He added that considerations to expand Russian control in

⁸⁰ Lord, The Second Partition, p. 42.

Poland were "reinforced by the long-felt desire for the finest acquisition the Empire could ever make."⁸¹ Catherine perfected her plans and only when they were set did she tell the Prussians what their part would be. The Poles, much as before, were unprepared. The Russian and Prussian move to conduct the partition of the remainder of the Commonwealth in 1793 came after the Poles had had sufficient time for military and diplomatic preparation. However, the Poles were caught in a state of unreadiness. The open knowledge that Catherine's opposition to the new Constitution was growing, in combination with suspicious troop movements, was not sufficient to alarm the Poles. A contemporary account reports that on the eve of the partition, "Warsaw was never more thronged or more brilliant" and compared Poles to Pompeians, dancing over the volcano on their last day.⁸²

While Poles continued to behave in a pattern the reader is growing accustomed to, the Russians, who had reminded others that they never did anything halfway,⁸³ were also predictable. Catherine's military commander in Warsaw,

⁸¹ Letter from Markov to S.R. Vorontsov, 8/19 November, 1792, Archif Knyasya Vorontsovo, 40 vols., Moscow 1876-1897, XX:32, cited by Ibid., p. 385.

⁸² J.I. Kraszewski, Polska w czasie trzech rozbiorow, 3 vols., (Warsaw, 1902-1903), III:124, cited by Ibid., p. 284.

⁸³ Henryk Schmitt, History of the Reign of Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski, 3 vols., (Lwow, 1868-1869), II:197, cited by Kaplan, The First Partition, p. 77.

General Igelstrom, refused to allow a single Polish regiment or a single cannon from the Warsaw arsenal to be sent against the Russians.⁸⁴ The Second Partition of Poland, which totally divided Poland and thus ended Polish state existence, was accomplished more easily than the battles which followed.

3. Polish Defiance and the Third Partition

Polish military response again commenced after the opportune time. Led by General Tadeusz Kosciuszko, who had previously distinguished himself in the American Revolutionary War, the Poles wrung out several victories. Important was an early battle in which the General led sythe-bearing peasants to victory against professional Russian troops. This success rallied Polish support for his rebellion and contributed to victories in several more battles, but timing and Russian predominance denied him a victorious campaign. Following the Polish defeat at Maciejowice, where Kosciuszko was captured, the Polish rebellion faced inevitable defeat. However, it did not occur until after Catherine's troops, under the command of General Suworov,⁸⁵ slaughtered not only the defenders but also the

⁸⁴ Lord, The Second Partition, p. 395.

⁸⁵ He was only later promoted to his more familiar rank of Marshal.

population of Praga, outside Warsaw. This ruthless act, unnecessary in the military sense, underscored the enmity felt between the two cultures. With the Russian defeat of Kosciuszko's rebellion, came the Third Partition of Poland.

D. RUSSIA'S POLISH PROVINCE

During the eighteenth century, Russian strength flows. Russian desire to expand combines with memories of Polish interference and orients the Russians in part towards the West. Russian influence over Poland grows by stages until, under Catherine, Polish statehood has been extinguished. This process is accompanied by ruthless acts which serve only to increase the enmity already clearly in evidence. While the second period of Polish history, referred to at the beginning of this chapter, is not viewed as ending with the Partitions, there is a notable delineation at this point. The shifting balance of power which lead to the Partitions becomes a status quo power balance which exists throughout the nineteenth century and to which this review now turns.

The history of Polish-Russian relations in the nineteenth century started with Napoleon, but was punctuated by major rebellions in 1830 and 1863. Between 1807 and 1809,

Napoleon created the Duchy of Warsaw from the Prussian and Austro-Hungarian partitions. French support for Poland had always been high, and the French presence in the Duchy, with the revolutionary encouragement which that provided to the Poles across the Nieman River in the Russian Partition, prompted Tsar Nicholas I to grant his Poland a new constitution which gave it great autonomy and guaranteed the freedoms of speech, press, and association while granting special protection and privilege to the Roman Catholic Church. At the same time, the Tsar added "I have created such organs of repression as will make the Poles understand that they must not go beyond a certain limit."⁸⁶ While this statement sounds moderate, it also bears a resemblance to modern Soviet statements regarding the limits of current East European initiatives. At least one contemporary conservative thinker expressed sharper views when he wrote in 1811 that his nation's interests demanded that "there be no Poland under any shape or name."⁸⁷

Napoleon's attack into Russia with the Grande Armee in 1812 was viewed by the Poles as another opportunity to

⁸⁶ Walsh, Russia and the Soviet Union, p. 173.

⁸⁷ Richard Pipes, ed., Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 145.

regain their independence. Their military support of the Armee was praised by the Emperor. But the venture failed, and with the French retreat from Moscow through the Duchy came Russian troops. The Congress of Vienna (1815) ceded the Duchy to Alexander I.

1. Revolution of 1830

Russian thought and attitudes towards Poland begin to reflect a shift after 1815. As was implied in earlier discussion, ethnically Russian territory was recovered with the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667. Following the Partitions, the new territories gained were called the "Polish provinces," the "provinces detached from Poland," or simply, "Polish lands." These titles reflected Russian acceptance of the non-Russian character of the Polish territory in question. However, after 1819, they came to be referred to as the "Western provinces."⁸⁸ As the belief that Poland was an integral part of the Russian Empire grew in Russian minds, so too did the Polish desire to remove the Russian yoke.

The Russian yoke was next assaulted by the November 1830 rebellion. It was started without any unity of

⁸⁸ Piotr S. Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 6.

purpose.⁸⁹ Divisions existed within the revolutionary's and between them and the general population. It commenced with an ill-planned rebellion lead by the most junior officers. They succeeded in expelling the Russian garrison from Warsaw, but the pre-existing internal dissensions soon weakened the revolutionaries. The Polish government contributed further to the weak Polish response by waiting too long to call up more Polish forces.

On the other hand, Nicholas I, of Russia, ordered Russian troops into Poland to crush the Rebellion as soon as he learned of it. The slow Polish reaction interacted with the speedy Russian response in a predictable manner. Polish disorganization and lack of unity were debilitating. In one instance, General Dwernicki "fought a fine cavalry battle at Boremb, but later, being insufficiently assisted by the local insurgents, he was forced into Austria and out of the war."⁹⁰ While noting the heroism of the Polish soldiers, "the war ended in defeat because there were no capable leaders."⁹¹

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁹⁰ W.F. Reddaway et al., The Cambridge History of Poland, 2 vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1950-1951), II:304. Emphasis added.

⁹¹ Ibid., II:310.

For their unsuccessful rebellion, the Poles were rewarded with loss of their autonomous status and increasing efforts to Russify them. Tsar Nicholas I allegedly said that he "knew only two sorts of Poles, those whom he hated and those whom he despised."⁹² A final reflection of Russian attitudes towards the Poles was rendered by Pushkin, who in To Russia's Slanderers asserted his country's right to crush the Polish rebellion, and promised foreign interventionists the "same treatment previously meted out to Napoleon."⁹³ Russia's conviction that it possessed a right to Polish territory was growing stronger with the passage of time. Integration after 1830 included an act which made the Russian ruble the official currency in Poland.

Another subject for dispute which arose during the mid-nineteenth century was that of Pan-Slavism. Various interpretations included those of Pan-Slavism and Slavophilism. One contemporary writer addressed the distinction between the two. Slavophilism, he noted, reflected the views of the Poles and aimed at "independence and equal dignity... of all branches of this great [Slav]

⁹² Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 3. The Poles also shared a similar view of the Russians.

⁹³ Ronald Hingley, The Russian Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), p. 159.

tribe." This ran directly counter to the Pan-Slavism of the Russians which, as Pushkin had said, was "understood as the flowing of all Slav rivers into the Russian sea."⁹⁴ Russian Pan-Slavism "envisaged not a Slavic collaboration in freedom and equality, but a Russian domination over the Slavs."⁹⁵ This dispute marks another major philosophical difference between the Poles and the Russians. It is time to return to the chronological thread of this review.

After the 1830 Revolution, Russian domination increased. It was signalled in part by Polish loss of autonomy and by the monetary intergration of 1841. However, following the Russian defeat in the Crimean War (1854-1856), this trend subsided. Adam Ulam notes that this defeat brought to an end an ideological phase of Tsarist Russia's foreign policy which had begun in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna⁹⁶ and had been highlighted in part in the dispute over Pan-Slavism. The turn away from ideological considerations resulted in the easing of Russian domination

⁹⁴ Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 11.

⁹⁵ Encyclopaedia Britannica (1967). s.v. "Pan-Slavism," by Hans Kohn.

⁹⁶ Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1974), p. 7.

of Poland and this in turn lead almost directly to the Revolution of 1863.

2. Revolution of 1863

Phrases used to describe the Revolution of 1863 are remarkably similar to those describing 1830, 1794 (Kosciuszko), as well perhaps as the Bar Confederation (1767). This revolution, while the most heroic, was ill-advised.⁹⁷ The revolutionaries were again split between the moderates and the radicals and apart from the peasants who were indifferent or hostile to the revolt. This revolt was also the bloodiest. Polish peasant soldiers, serving in the tsarist army, were released in order to stiffen the resistance against the revolt. When the insurgents discovered this, those soldiers who were caught, were hung.⁹⁸ Attempts by the Polish revolutionaries to gain support from nearby nations strengthened traditional Russian suspicions of collusion with the West.⁹⁹ The war, at times fought with guerilla methods, was concluded in 1864. Russia defeated the Poles by accentuating the divisions within

⁹⁷ Reddaway, Cambridge History, II:384.

⁹⁸ R.F. Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland 1856-1865 (London: The Athlone Press, 1963), p. 277.

⁹⁹ Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 14.

Polish society and by giving the Polish peasants their own land.

This revolution was viewed very seriously by the Russians. Mikhail Katkov, an ex-liberal, stated that "the insurrection threatened the sacred interests of Russia."¹⁰⁰ Ronald Hingley notes that in Dostoevsky's novels, his most "virulent contempt is reserved for the Poles: topographically adjacent, Catholics, rebels against Russian rule in 1863, and damned in all three capacities." This contempt is evidenced by his frequent use, as a figure in his novels, of the "wretched little Pole."¹⁰¹

While the Poles had formerly possessed a spirit of romanticism, both they and the Russians now adopted an attitude of realism. That of the Russians was far more pronounced. Poland became an occupied state and future nation of Russia. A strong policy of Russification was instituted. Russian became the sole language of administration, Polish geographic names were changed to Russian names and the Kingdom of Poland unofficially became Wisla or Wistula land.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁰¹ Hingley, Russian Mind, p. 148.

¹⁰² Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 16.

Pan-Slavism, with its two interpretations, gained a third one when Sergei Solov'ev wrote "Poles are called renegades and traitors" and have "lost all right to participate in the future greatness of Slavs." If this was not enough, the Poles were determined by the ethnographic congress held in Moscow in 1867 to be the "Judas of Slavdom." Finally, "A Russian citadel and a huge orthodox church in the center of Warsaw proclaimed to the world that Wisla land was a Tsarist colony."¹⁰³ This firm Russian reaction to the revolution of 1863 closes another phase. Future developments were to be formed and determined by forces new to the scene of Polish-Russian relations.

3. The Twentieth Century and the Polish Intervention

In the latter nineteenth century, a new movement of political thought was receiving attention throughout Europe. Marx's writings were read in Poland and his thoughts lead to the formation of several parties. The major party was the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Its program adopted in 1892, proclaimed as its aim an "independent democratic Polish Republic." This aim accurately revealed Polish interpretation of both Marx and Engels. The philosophy of

¹⁰³ Hans Kohn, ed., The Mind of Modern Russia (New York: 1962), p. 216, cited by Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 15 and other references Ibid., p. 15, and p. 19.

Polish communism linked the Marxian expression of class exploitation with the Polish concern over foreign oppression.¹⁰⁴ The growing strength of the PPS militia lead to the first Polish clash with the Russians when PPS militia exchanged shots with Russian gendarmes and soldiers in Warsaw in November 1904.¹⁰⁵ However, this small incident did little to alter Poland's subjugation. Not until World War I (WWI) did change appear possible. The importance of WWI was prophetically outlined circa 1906 by one Pole who understood that although Austro-Hungary and Prussia shared in the partition of his country, Russia was the primary enemy and that should war come to Europe, the Poles' final aim would be their independence. This Pole, an ex-socialist of the PPS, was named Jozef Pilsudski.¹⁰⁶

WWI saw Poland again become the battleground for other nations' disputes, but with the destruction of the three partitioning powers in that war, Poland seized its independence. With independence came the need to define and control Poland's boundaries. Soviet-German collusion as German troops withdrew from Poland allowed the Soviets to

¹⁰⁴ It is interesting to note that both Marx and Engels endorsed the Polish struggle for independence.

¹⁰⁵ Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 27.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 31.

occupy Polish territory and served to deny the Poles control of their territory. The need to define and control these lead the Poles, under the leadership of Pilsudski, to launch an attack on the infant Soviet Union. Newly formed Polish units moved deep into Soviet territory in 1919 but were then forced to retreat to the gates of Warsaw. A counterattack, ordered by Pilsudski, reestablished control of the Polish frontiers and the two sides finally ended the Polish Intervention with the signing of the Treaty of Riga.

Closer examination of statement made by the participants reveals a Soviet attitude largely unchanged from that of their forebearers, the Tsarist Russians. Lenin spoke of Poland as "a Wall."¹⁰⁷ Another Soviet statement related the Soviet perception that Poland was either a bridge or a barrier to the spread of Communism. It added, poignantly, that if she was the latter, she must be smashed while if she was the former, she must become a Soviet Poland.¹⁰⁸ In a similar vein, Karl Radek, a Galician Polish Jew by birth, wrote in Izvestia

[Poland] has proved to us by deed that she cannot exist side by side with Soviet Russia. If the white guard

¹⁰⁷ Encyclopaedia Britannica (1967), s.v. "Russo-Polish War," by Kazimierz Maciej Smogorzewski.

¹⁰⁸ Joseph Korb, Poland between East and West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 11.

Poland cannot exist side by side with Soviet Russia,
then a Soviet Poland will.¹⁰⁹

Statements like these left little of the Soviet political aspirations unclear.

The comments above referred to Poland, the country. Others, equally poignant, referred to the Poles, themselves. Much has been said of the vituperative comments printed in Soviet papers in 1920 while the Russians had the upper hand. Voennoe Delo, a Soviet military daily, referred to the Poles as "Lakhs" - a derogatory term. After these and other statements, Lenin instructed the military papers to tone down their chauvinistic overtones and insisted on promoting the distinction "between the Polish lords, and the peasants and workers."¹¹⁰ However, shortly thereafter, he underscored the tactical nature of these instructions when he wrote "from a political point of view it is most important to kill Poland."¹¹¹

The similarity of the Soviet views to their Tsarist heritage was not the only continuity evident. Commenting on the Poles, Dzerzhinskii wrote that when the Soviets reached

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 42.

¹¹⁰ Leninskii Sbornik (Moscow, 1942), XXXIV:293, cited by Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 201.

¹¹¹ Trotsky Archives, file A, August 1920, cited by Korbel, Poland between East and West, p. 54.

Bialystok, the first Polish city, they "felt no power." He wrote further that the leaders of the Polish Communist Party "did not know how to master the masses or the political situation." He added "they miss a leader - a Lenin."¹¹² He was well based in his comments; he was a Pole by birth.

While Polish political leadership was wanting, its military leadership was better. The counterattack lead by Pilsudski in 1920 which reestablished the Polish boundaries illuminated the Polish tendency to wait until the last opportunity to organize. Many Poles remember that "the guns near Warsaw became a tocsin which warns and awakens."¹¹³

E. INDEPENDENT POLAND EMERGES

With the Treaty of Riga came peace. Marshal Pilsudski retired and the Poles continued to operate in manners that have never stood the test of reality. The constitution provided for a weak executive.

Free elections brought into the legislature a multitude of political groups and factions unable to produce a stable majority except in extreme situations...Numerous

¹¹² F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Dnevnik: Pisma k rodnym (Moscow, 1958), p. 258-260, letters of 17 and 25 August, 1920, cited by Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 230.

¹¹³ Trampczynskii on September 24 1920, Sprawozdanie stenograficzne 1919-1921 (Sejm Ustawodawczy R.P.) CLXVIII/4, cited by Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relation, p. 241.

changes in cabinets, frequent parliamentary crises, continuous bickerings, personal quarrels, and clashes of ambitions

marked Polish government.¹¹⁴

Themes of the Polish political culture and Russo-Polish relations, already familiar, were given added credence by the experiences of independent Poland between the wars. After observing that Poland's parliamentary democracy was "reviving the anarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries," Marshal Pilsudski returned to the leadership of the country in 1926.¹¹⁵ Colonel Beck, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted that "the authority of Marshal Pilsudski was the decisive factor in the ... affairs of Poland."¹¹⁶ The New York Times using the same metaphor as the eighteenth century English diplomat, supported this view when its obituary noted that "no other such human rock to dominate and direct the Polish tide" existed after his death.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Barnett, Poland: Its People, p. 21. In another revealing aside, the "Constitution" of 1921 officially recognized the "leading position" of the Catholic Church. This is remarkably similar to the current dispute over the "leading role" of the Communist Party for Solidarity. Ibid., p. 71.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 22.

¹¹⁶ Colonel Jozef Beck, Final Report, (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1957), p. 264.

¹¹⁷ New York Times, 13 May 1935, cited by Bohdan B. Budurówycz, Polish-Soviet Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 72.

Marshal Pilsudski's foreign policy to the East called for the establishment of buffer states from the Baltic republics through Byelorussia and the Ukraine to Romania, on the Black Sea. His desire to unite these in alliance against the Soviets flew directly in the face of the Soviet/Russian urge to open the West. Tension with the Soviet Union reached the level of disturbing Soviet military activities in 1930, 1936, and 1938.¹¹⁸ Soviet attitudes registered little change as Molotov revealed when he called Poland, in 1939, "an ugly off-spring of Versailles."¹¹⁹

Hitler's intrigues allowed the Soviets to realize the partial fulfillment of their designs to regain control of Poland later that year. The Polish Government in Exile (London Poles), with whom the Russians maintained minimal contact was "riven by dissensions and clashing views as to how to deal with [the Soviet might]."¹²⁰ Soviet relations deteriorated as their battlefield successes multiplied. Relations were finally broken off over the Polish protest of the rather clear Soviet murder of thousands of Polish officers in Katyn Forest. A final Soviet underscoring of

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 8 and p. 83, Beck, Final Report, p. 168.

¹¹⁹ Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 210.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 342.

their position towards the nationalist Polish elements came with their total lack of support of the Warsaw Uprising which lead to the extinction of the remaining Polish nationalists. With the end of WWII, the Soviets were in position to reestablish their traditional hegemony over Poland.

F. A NOTE ON POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE

This review has also provided examples of the Polish political culture. Jan Szczepanski, currently President of the Polish Writers' Union, has provided a succinct list of traits of the Polish political culture. Of these traits, three have been well developed and are simply listed below. They are:

- 1) the cult of individualism,
- 2) the intransigence of the gentry to subordination, and
- 3) the inability to organize collectively for any long term efforts.

Four more traits are listed by Szczepanski. One is bravery. The case of Kosciuszko's sythe-bearing peasants is clear evidence. Napoleon also gave praise on this point when

he said, "I love Poles on the battlefield, they are brave people."¹²¹ A second trait related is of a highly developed feeling of honor and personal dignity. Harder to support, one indication of this quality is provided by another observation from the Napoleonic wars. In writing of the allied contingents of the Grande Armee, one author wrote, "by far the most loyal and aggressive were the Poles."¹²² Szczepanski also felt that deep patriotism and national pride were notable qualities of the Polish political culture.¹²³ Poland has experienced greatness and subordination each for long periods of its thousand-year history. Cultural trait weaknesses did not appear evident during its period of power, and were key to its fall. Later, analysis will focus on whether a fundamental or significant change has occurred and is contributing to the success, thus far, of the current course of events unfolding in Poland today.

¹²¹ Eugene Tarle, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), p. 103.

¹²² R.F. Delderfield, The Retreat from Moscow (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 25.

¹²³ Jan Szczepanski, Polish Society (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 11.

G. CONCLUSION

This review posed a question at the opening. What is Poland to the Soviet Union? The clearest answer to this question is provided by a Russian who wrote in 1811. "Let foreigners condemn the Partition of Poland - we took what was ours."¹²⁴ Since then, they have had almost one hundred seventy years to build in their minds the legitimacy of their claims. Indeed, this is not pure speculation. Dmitri Simes has stated that there are still people in high government positions in the Soviet Union who cannot refer to Poland as anything but the "Wisla Provinces."¹²⁵ To them, Poland is Russia.

But there are also other answers. Poland is a culturally different entity. The combination of cultures has developed a pattern of domination of one by the other over a period of almost four hundred years. Historically, and continuing to this day, Poland has been the gateway to Europe and the conquerors thoroughfare to Moscow. Chekov's observation on the weight of history underscores this importance. Finally, Poland is a land whose people have

¹²⁴ Pipes, Karamzin's Memoir, p. 132.

¹²⁵ Interview with Dmitri Simes, Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, Washington, d.c., 22 December 1980.

evidenced an inability to govern themselves and who thus pose a continual nuisance and threat to Russian/Soviet security.

While these are the Soviet claims on Poland, they have only been able to exercise them when Polish culture was anarchic. Is there a change today? Has Poland overcome organizational problems and prepared in time? These must be questions which are weighing heavily on the minds of the Soviet decision makers today.

IV. SOVIET STAKES

In the last chapter, we examined the historical interplay of Russia and Poland in an effort to gain an appreciation for Poland from the Soviet perspective. While this revealed how the current events challenge that Soviet/Russian worldview, it offered only one view of Poland's significance. At a level of analysis which considers shorter-term ramifications there are many other challenges. It is to the Soviet stakes which these challenges attack that this analysis now turns.

At the root of the current disturbance is the Soviet role in and control of Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe is to the Soviets unlike any other area of the world because there, rather than seeking additional influence, the Soviets are attempting to prevent loss of an established and internationally recognized influence.¹²⁶ The nature of this influence is nowhere more clearly characterized than in the words of Leonid Brezhnev. "It is an invincible military

¹²⁶ Andrzej Korbonski, "Eastern Europe and the Soviet Threat," Academy of Political Science Proceedings 33 (No. 1, 1978): 75.

union, characterized by a unity of world views, a unity of goals, and a unity of will."¹²⁷

In one sense, Soviet attempts to secure influence in Eastern Europe since World War II have been characterized by the words cohesion and viability.¹²⁸ Cohesion implies conformity to the Soviet model and, conceptually, leads to absolute control. This absolute control can only be maintained with physical force. Because of the extreme cost of this, the Soviets have tried to balance the goal of cohesion with that of viability, a quality that lends legitimacy to the East European political structures. The history of postwar Eastern Europe then reflects the shifting equilibrium between these two concepts, and today's difficulties can be seen as a Soviet dilemma between the two. Just what are the Soviet stakes in Poland? What is the threat to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)? How does Poland challenge the Soviet model for a domestic political system? Are there challenges which strike directly at the

¹²⁷ Robert Rand, The Polish Crisis and Soviet Foreign Policy (Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 316/80, Munich, 12 September 1980), p. 1.

¹²⁸ J.F. Brown, Relations between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European Allies: A Survey (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1975), p. 3.

hearts of Russians? What are the competing interests the Soviets may have to trade off?

A. CHALLENGES TO THE EAST EUROPEAN CONTROL STRUCTURES

The principle structures created by the Soviets to secure control of Eastern European countries collectively have been the WTO and the CMEA. While the structures themselves are a quarter century old, the manner of their use has evolved since they were established. Each of them must be addressed in detail.

1. Warsaw Treaty Organization

Today, the Soviets station two tank divisions with approximately 35,000 troops and 650 tanks in western Poland. Their disposition is indicative of a role against a threat envisioned to lie further to the west. Conventional wisdom calls for Poland to play an important role in any future European war. It is vital as a resupply, reinforcement and communications link to Warsaw Pact forces in East Germany (GDR). It is perhaps more important as an assembly area for Soviet second echelon forces necessary in any offensive action planned according to current Soviet military doctrine. Finally, it is anticipated that Polish airfields and seaports would replace ones farther to the West, in the

GDR, which are expected to be lost early in any scenario.¹²⁹ These make Poland's contribution to the Warsaw Pact clear. Any instability in Poland must jeopardize future Pact effectiveness.

But the traditional view of the WTO which sees it primarily as a response to counter the threat of NATO and to defend East Europe and the Soviet Union from Western aggression must be questioned. The WTO has another important function. At the 24th and 25th Party Congresses (April 1971 and February 1976, respectively) Leonid Brezhnev said that the WTO "has served and continues to serve as the main center for coordinating the foreign policy activity of the fraternal countries."¹³⁰ Statements by Soviet General S. M. Shtemenko, former commander of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, are even more illuminating. The mission of the WTO is "suppression of counterrevolutionary and aggressive action against socialist countries."¹³¹ Lest there be any doubt, Shtemenko added that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was an example of such a mission.

¹²⁹ "Poland's Geography: Russia's Gateway to the West," Drew Middleton, New York Times, 6 April 1981, p. A-11.

¹³⁰ Christopher Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention," World Politics 29 (January 1977), p. 222.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 232.

Offering a final piece of corroborating evidence are the war plans of the only two East European countries who have developed even nominally viable unilateral defense plans. The threat envisioned by both Yugoslavia and Romania numbers between .75 and 1.25 million troops who would operate in a non-nuclear environment.¹³² This threat contrasts with the general conception of a European war as recently popularized in General Sir John Hackett's The Third World War, August 1985 but bears greater similarity with previous interventions legitimized by the WTO.

A corollary to the second mission identified by Shtemenko is to limit the establishment of just such military organizations as the Yugoslavs and the Romanians have. It is not without reason that these are the only two countries in the Soviet Bloc which can also be characterized by their much greater freedom from Soviet guidance. Questionable loyalty of Poland's 350,000 man citizen's militia (not previously addressed) must be causing the Soviet military great uneasiness.¹³³

¹³² Christopher Jones, "The Warsaw Pact: Military Exercises and Military Interventions," Armed Forces and Society 7 (Fall 1980), p. 6.

¹³³ Middleton, New York Times, 6 April 1981.

The Soviets have sought to limit the independence of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) armies by keeping key elements of logistics in the areas of communications, transport and supply under Soviet control. Subject to greater argument are claims that special units, such as the rocket and air defence forces, are under the command of Soviet officers and would effectively remain outside the control of the NSWP organizations of which they are legally apart.¹³⁴

If the principle purpose of the WTO is to maintain the Soviet position in NSWP nations, as Gen Shtemenko stated, then current activities in Poland pose a serious challenge to the Soviet stake of an effective WTO, even though the Poles have gone to great lengths to acknowledge their WTO responsibilities.

2. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)

Continued viability of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is a second Soviet stake. While in the early years of its existence the CMEA was a mechanism which made Soviet exploitation of East European industrial capability more efficient, the 1970's witnessed increasing integration of the member states. In July, 1971, the CMEA

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

adopted a "Comprehensive Program" leading to the aforementioned long-term economic integration through transnational enterprise cooperation. This was followed in 1975 by the first Joint Coordinating Economic Plan. This plan was distinct from the national plans. It first targeted raw materials, minerals, and mineral fuels. One example of the ventures which followed these agreements is a company named PetroBaltic. The USSR, GDR, and Poland established it to explore and develop oil fields in the Baltic Sea. Coincidentally, its headquarters were located in Gdansk.

The integration desired by the Soviets and called for in these agreements are seriously threatened by the unrest in Poland. During the August strikes, Baltic seaports in the USSR and the GDR were forced to handle Polish bound cargo which could not go through the strikebound Polish ports. This additional burden was not carried without expense to the GDR and the USSR. The disturbance of the CMEA plans and the national economic plans which started then has continued. In December 1980, the GDR claimed that "no deliveries of Polish anthracite coal from Silesia have been delivered in recent months" and that this was "forcing slowdowns in the production of

electricity and steel".¹³⁵ Increased exports from the GDR to Poland have resulted in shortages within the GDR itself.

In evidence of the Soviet awareness of this stake were meetings between Polish Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Jagielski and the Soviet GOSPLAN chief Nikolai Baibakov held in late December. Specific topics of discussion included the plan for Soviet-Polish cooperation in the period 1981-1985.

With coal production in Poland down by 25%, and other production diminished to lesser, though still significant degrees, the Soviets have ample evidence to support fears that their plans for coordinated economic development will be thwarted.¹³⁶

B. CHALLENGES TO THE SOVIET MODEL

The two regional extranational control structures discussed above are only one group of challenges and stakes which the current Polish situation threatens. A second group of stakes currently challenged are of increasingly fundamental value to the Soviets because they constitute a latent threat to the style of Soviet communism. These

¹³⁵ Washington Star, 7 December 1980.

¹³⁶ The section on the economy in Chapter I provides greater detail of these current difficulties.

challenges to the Soviet model include the topics of party control, national economic management, and ideology. Potential ramifications of unsatisfactory answers to these questions are amplified by the last topic to be addressed in this section, that of spillover into other nations of Eastern Europe.

1. Party Control

Party control is paramount to the Soviet system of national political organization. It is manifested and promoted in a variety of ways, many of which are being challenged in Poland today.

One aspect of party control is the preeminence of the party. Dual power, which arises in many situations when the party has lost its "leading role" gained a very bad reputation in the Soviet mind during the revolution when the Bolsheviks controlled Petrograd and the Provisional Government controlled Moscow. Neither government was effective during the period of March-October 1917 while this situation existed. V.I. Lenin's views of the dangers of dual power must haunt Soviet leaders daily.

This Soviet sensitivity has not inhibited Kania from routinely referring to the dyarchy arising within Poland today. From his perspective, and not his alone, the

Solidarity trade union has assumed the role of a political institution which is juxtaposed to the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). Lent greater significance because its author is an East German dissident is Robert Havemann's observation that

Allowing free trade unions means nothing less than that the only big working class organization recognized by the masses as their representative is to be independent of the party and thus of the Politburo.

In his words, this spells the "end of power of the Politburo."¹³⁷

The role of Solidarity as a competing power center is only one way in which the prescription of party control has been attacked by recent developments in Poland. Another is in the weakening of the system of nomenklatura. This system allows installation of approved communist party members into all organizations of a country. It provides for the necessary control by and feedback to the ruling communist party. While claiming one million members of PUWP in its own membership, Solidarity has no nomenklatura. This underscores the separation of the power of Solidarity from

¹³⁷ "DPA Cites GDR Dissident's Letter on Events in Poland," DPA(Hamburg), 14 September 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 15 September 1980, p. E-1.

that of the PUWP and must be difficult for the Soviets to accept.

Party control is also being attacked in a variety of other ways. One is in the weakened security services. Solidarity's success at obtaining and declassifying a "state secret" document in November 1980 must be viewed with horror by a variety of Soviet leaders. Another attack on party control comes with the abolition of strict censorship and the decision to open the media to the Catholic Church and the trade unions. This is of profound significance. Control of the media is a central requirement for party control. One observer viewed it as so important that in August he wrote that it would be the sticking point for Moscow.¹³⁸ Again, from these discussions, and those in Chapter I, it is evident that party control is facing a broad and serious challenge in Poland today.

2. Soviet Model of Economic Management

Economic problems in Poland were previously discussed. Problems of inadequate incentives, worker apathy induced by disguised unemployment, poor consumer goods and services, housing scarcities, and inefficient agriculture

¹³⁸ "Soviet Appears to Accept Polish Unrest Calmly So Far," New York Times, 23 August 1980, p. 8.

limit per capita productivity in Eastern Europe to something less than that of Western Europe and are a reflection of systemic problems arising from the Soviet system of economy and the organization of production. "Yet the Soviets shy away from economic experimentation and reform because of its short run economic costs and its potential political dangers."¹³⁹ This reticence to experiment was amply demonstrated when the chairman of GOSPLAN wrote that "there is no and cannot be any alternative to centralized control for a unified national economic complex."¹⁴⁰ Surrender to the demands made by Solidarity "means the negation of the state's economic functions and the party's leading role."¹⁴¹ Current Soviet concern over this challenge is supported by quotes to the effect that V.I. Lenin "was sharply against this."

While the problems and direction of attempts at reform are not agreeable to the Soviets, they are certainly aware of reality. Polish problems are similar to problems experienced throughout the Soviet/East European Bloc. They

¹³⁹ J. Triska, "Soviet-East European Relations," in The Soviet Union: Looking to the Eighties, ed. Robert Wesson (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), p. 56.

¹⁴⁰ Moscow Planovoye Khozyaystvo No. 2, 9 January 1981, p. 6-17, in FBIS-USSR, 13 March 1981, Annex.

¹⁴¹ "V.I. Lenin on the Trade Unions," Moscow, Pravda, 25 September 1980, p. 2, in FBIS-USSR, 30 September 1980, p. BB1.

are more acute simply because they are more advanced. Indicative of this sensitivity are actions such as those taken by the Czechs in August 1980 (during the strikes) when Czech party groups were admonished to "heed workers suggestions."¹⁴²

3. Ideology

One should not fail to mention that at the heart of many of the challenges discussed both above and below is the stake of Soviet ideology. It is closely bound to the legitimacy of Soviet actions and goals. At a specific level, challenges of how trade unions are integrated within society, the economic organization of society, and the role of the party within society all raise questions of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology. But ideology is being even more fundamentally challenged. One scholar has written that

"The raison d'etre of the Soviet communist party is to fulfill an ideological mission to transform both Russia and the international society first into socialism and then ultimately to full communism, as defined by Marx and Lenin."¹⁴³

¹⁴² "In Businesslike and Efficient Manner," Rude Pravo (Prague), 25 August 1980, p. 1, in FBIS-EEU, 27 August 1980, p. D-3.

¹⁴³ John Keep, "Russia and the Soviet Union," in The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Handbook, ed. George Schopflin, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 127. Emphasis added.

Evidence of a more general echo within Eastern Europe increases the drama of the events occurring in Poland today.

4. Spillover into Eastern Europe

This analysis returns to the familiar root stake and challenge-control of Eastern Europe. Do these problems, these precedents, foreshadow unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe? Both suspicion and evidence tend to answer this question in the affirmative. Rendering the clearest evidence is the perception of other Eastern European leaders as reflected in their recent activities and statements.

In Czechoslovakia, increasing attention has been given to insuring adequate food supplies and stress has been placed on worker-management relations.^{1♦♦} While the role of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia in no way compares with its role in Poland, it is intriguing to note that Gustav Husak's message to a Catholic professor on the occasion of his 70th birthday received media attention. In his greeting, the Czech CP chairman noted the clergyman's "highly appreciated public activity, significant contributions to the development of socialist society, and the positive development of relations between the church and

^{1♦♦} Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report/263, 30 October, 1980, p. 4.

the state."¹⁴⁵ While this single report may reflect less, it appears to be high praise for a non-Communist member of the Czech society. This is only one way the East European states are demonstrating their increased sensitivity to the Polish events.

The GDR has reacted somewhat differently. Lying between the 'liberal' West Germany and a Poland struggling for liberties, the salvation of Erich Honecker's communist regime has become his absolute priority.¹⁴⁶ A very harsh tone towards both Poland and the FRG give some credence to the observation that Honecker has probably adopted the strategy which considers the best defense to be a strong offense.¹⁴⁷ Intervention in Poland may cause unpredictable events in the GDR because of the major strains which exist within the country.¹⁴⁸

Other Eastern European countries show less sensitivity. Questions have arisen over potential trouble within Romania, but the threat seems to be less rabidly

¹⁴⁵ CTK (Prague), 29 January 1981, in FBIS-EEU, 3 February 1981, p. D-14.

¹⁴⁶ "Fishing in Troubled Waters," Bonn, Die Welt, 16 December 1980, in FBIS-WE, 17 December 1980, p. J-4.

¹⁴⁷ "Tension-Proof East Germany, II--The FRG, an Intimate Enemy," Paris, Le Monde, 11 February 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 17 February 1980, p. E-6.

¹⁴⁸ Washington Star, 7 December 1980.

regarded. Hungary, quietly conducting an economic experiment far from the Soviet norm has gone so far as to invite Walesa for a visit while noting the "unabated interest in the Polish issues" during the Hungarian trade union's congress held during mid-December, 1980. Indeed, interest throughout Eastern Europe in what has been called a third model of political organization is generally high while degrees of sensitivity vary across a wide spectrum. The Soviet fear of a spillover of the contagion of Polish reform is sufficiently supported by evidence to be considered important. While pre-dating the August events, words from a purported manifesto written by East German mid- and high-level officials accurately reveals what must be the one Soviet concern.

The worldwide tendency of the international worker's movement will result in the decay of the Moscow theory and practice. Creative, undogmatic, democratic-humanitarian communism is developing.¹⁴⁹

C. DIRECT CHALLENGES TO THE USSR

Of a uniquely different nature are a final group of stakes. Those already discussed had direct impact on Soviet control of Eastern Europe. This concluding set of stakes is

¹⁴⁹ Jiri Valenta, "Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe," Problems in Communism, 27 (March-April 1978), p. 53.

made up of those which directly challenge USSR. Continuing from the last section is spillover, but now into the Soviet Union itself.

1. Spillover of Trade Union Movements into the USSR

Question: What is proletarian internationalism?

Answer: That's when there's no meat in Moscow and there are strikes in Poland.

As many jokes do, this one gives a unique understanding of the Soviet sensitivity to spillover. The cities can be as easily reversed in the joke as in reality. Greatest opportunities for the spillover into the Soviet Union arise from increased worker militancy and increased expressions of nationalism. The first attacks the current socio-economic order while the second attacks the political order.

Trade unions play an important and particular role in this transformation. Lenin and Trotsky disputed the role. Trotsky argued that trade unions were a mere adjunct of the proletarian state apparatus while Lenin's conception of their role was much more emphatic. "Only in close cooperation with and under the direct leadership of the party of the working class" could they fulfill this role.

Long and continuing Soviet animosity towards Trotsky, and the semblance of a Trotskyite trade union in Poland today stoke the fire of Soviet indignation and concern yet further.

Soviet workers have provided the authorities with what they percieve to be serious and apparently growing problems. Contributing further evidence of the Soviet sensitivities is the elusiveness of data on this subject. From the rumored bloody suppression of the Novocherkassk strike of the early 1960's, the Soviet workers have proceeded much in the manner of the Poles, that is, with increasing wisdom. Strikes at the Togliatti automobile plant were followed in the winter of 1977-1978 with the formation of the Free Association of Workers headed by Vladimir Klebanov. His organization was active for several months during the summer of 1978 until his detention and subsequent "treatment" at a psychiatric hospital in Dnepropetrovsk. Following him came Vladimir Borisov, leader of the Free Interprofessional Union of Workers (SMOT). He was imprisoned in 1980 and later exiled to the West. These were doubtlessly small and very local challenges to the Soviet authority.

However, recently, evidence has come to light of a quantum leap in organization of unofficial Soviet trade unions. In an interview in March 1981, Alexander Ginsberg claimed that the Polish events are having an "enormous effect in the USSR." He revealed a new underground organization existing in seventeen large Soviet cities including Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and Novosibirsk.¹⁵⁰ If this report is true, the Soviets have much reason to fear hearing the Polish echo in Moscow. Given their brutal handling of these tendencies in the past, the observer must conclude that the Soviet sensitivity in the face of increasingly strong opposition is correspondingly heightened.

2. Spillover of Expressions of Nationalism into the USSR

Concern over the trade union movement is only one of two major forms which spillover can take up. A second is in the form of intensified nationalism. Events in Lithuania and Estonia have demonstrated this possibility. Estonia has presented the most significant problem especially since September 1980. In late September, twenty dissidents from

¹⁵⁰ "Polish Unrest in the Soviet Union." Oslo, Arbeiderbladet, 4 March 1981, in FBIS-USSR, 6 March 1981, p. R-2-3.

the Baltic republics issued a statement which congratulated Walesa for his success in part for bringing about democratic reforms.¹⁵¹ At about the same time, school children protested in Estonia for "complete independence for Estonia." This was accompanied by a strike at a local tractor factory. In late October, the "Appeal of the Forty" echoed the school children's demands.¹⁵² Soviet concern was amply demonstrated by Yuri Andropov's sudden visit and equally sudden firing of his KGB chief in Talinn.

Trouble in the Baltic republics has apparently not been limited to Estonia. The borders of Lithuania were closed to Poland in July, 1980, during the most initial stages of the Polish strikes. Subsequently, other unexplained closures of the Republic's borders to foreigners have occurred. These challenges are of the highest order of magnitude since they threaten the continued existence of an unchanged USSR. Difficulties have also been noted in the Ukraine where trade union questions are subject to combination with nationalistic urges.

While clear evidence exists that the Soviets have ample reason to be concerned with internal security and -----

¹⁵¹ Studium News Abstracts, No. 4, October 1980, p. 8.

¹⁵² "Appeal of the 40," Svenska Dagbladet (Stockholm), 10 February 1981, in FBIS USSR, 19 February 1981, p. R-95.

challenges to the current economic order, more strident and effective control of information has lead Roy Medvedev to believe that this chance remains small.¹⁵³ As always, in questions of difference between reality and perception, the latter has greater weight. The chance for spillover into the Soviet Union to occur must be on Soviet minds continually.

D. COMPETING STAKES

Thus far the discussion has been limited to the stakes which have been raised by the events in Poland. However, these are not the only stakes which the Soviets have. Others compete with the first and add to the challenge of the Soviet decision making process. One stake of major importance to the Soviets is detente. While essentially dead with the US, the spirit of a selective detente within western Europe is still very much alive. While the long term Soviet intentions are heatedly argued, certain short-term benefits seem clear. With the naissance of detente, the Soviets were able to maintain their economic system and their domestic order without reform while making up for the

¹⁵³ "Moscow Does Not Fear 'Polish Contagion'," La Stampa (Turin), 28 September 1980, p. 7, in FBIS-USSR, 3 October 1980, Annex.

inefficiencies of both of these with increased trade with the West.

Since August of 1980, the Europeans have made it very clear that all aspects of detente would end upon the event of a Soviet intervention in Poland. The Italians issued a communique of non-interference in Poland in the middle of December. The Germans, whose Ostpolitik hinges on relations with Poland, and who are the West's largest trade partner with Poland, would be expected to have the most to lose with the end of this selected detente. Notwithstanding this, on December 9, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt warned the Soviets against intervention. Klaus von Dohnanyi, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, clarified the German position by announcing shortly thereafter that West European help would only occur in the absence of outside interference in Poland's internal affairs. The French have made similar statements. Although the new French government's attitude vis-a-vis Poland has not been made clear, Francois Poncet, the former French foreign minister, agreed with West Germany's position on Poland stating that "the Paris and Bonn leaders have identical feelings."¹⁵⁴ The British

¹⁵⁴ "Francois Poncet Says in Bonn: Foreign Intervention Would Create 'Extremely Grave Crisis'," Paris, Le Monde, 29 November 1980, in FBIS-WE, 5 December 1980, p. K-1.

position is not unlike those of the French and Germans. Lord Carrington, British Foreign Secretary, noted that the cost of Soviet intervention in Poland would include the end of detente. Indeed, this level of European unity has not been seen for years. West Germany's Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, spoke for the Europeans when he said that their combined position "was being assessed uniformly and in full accord."¹⁵⁵ The end of detente would mean the loss of western technology, aid and agricultural products. Perhaps the largest single loss would be the proposed pipeline which the Soviets are hoping to build with \$11 billion of financing and equipment from West Germany. At writing, the fate of this pipeline is already in jeopardy due to rising European interest rates. While interest rates have been blamed, this may signal Soviet acceptance of the fact that, politically, the loss is inevitable.

However, the end of detente with western Europe is not all the Soviets stand to lose. The Soviet economy needs detente because it is already approaching severe growth limitations. It is already currently involved in supporting Cuba and Viet Nam and its agriculture has never been strong.

¹⁵⁵ "Genscher Concerned by Eastern Criticism of Poland," ZDF(Mainz), 7 December 1980, in FBIS-WE, 9 December 1980, p. J-1.

The Polish debt, already extensively covered, would become a Soviet responsibility upon their intervention. Given the limitations within their economic system, this additional burden would be very expensive both financially and socially.

A third competing stake which the Soviets have lies in their relations with the Communist Parties of Western Europe. Eurocommunism is an affliction which causes the Soviets great concern. Its foundation shares with the Soviet's the same observations and beliefs of Marx. This allows it to appear very similar to the Soviet Communism. If appearances reflected the perceived reality, Eurocommunism would bode no ill for the Soviets. It is, however, substantially different. It is the result of interpretation of Marx and Lenin through the eyes of a western Catholic/Protestant heritage rather than the Byzantian perspective of the Russians. This renders it fundamentally if only subtly different. Because of the fundamental difference, it is in opposition to the Soviet line. It is dangerous because its subtlety leads the Soviets to fear that it may pass through the Iron Curtain by osmosis. Because of this Soviet perception, they seek to either split the Eurocommunist parties or to maintain

control of them through official contact. Poland challenges these wishes.

The Eurocommunists have adopted a position against external intervention in Poland and they have made this clear to the Soviets. Leading them in this démarche has been the Italian Communist Party (PCI). In early December, 1980, it released a statement which said "we regard military intervention in Poland by the Warsaw Pact countries as a very serious matter, entirely unacceptable to us."¹⁵⁶ In a private letter to the leaders of the other European Communist Parties, The PCI has warned of "irreparable consequences" to the intercommunist relations if there is intervention. Soviet displeasure with the PCI has reached such a point that at a meeting of Carlo Pajetta of the PCI and Vadim Zagladin, CPSU Foreign Affairs Chief, the Soviets expressed "concern over a situation which they are trying to get out of without breaks in relations taking place." The most recent escalation occurred at the end of February when the Soviets published a confidential letter from the CPSU Central Committee addressed to Enrico Berlinguer, the head of the PCI. In this letter, the Soviets accused him of

¹⁵⁶ "Poles Alone Must Resolve Their Problems,"
L'Unità (Rome), 6 December 1980, in FBIS-WE, 10 December
1980, p. L-1.

disloyalty.¹⁵⁷ The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has announced that it would sever relations with the CPSU if the feared armed intervention occurred. Future Soviet influence in the major West European Communist Parties is gravely challenged by the Polish events.

Another competing stake with which the Soviets must contend is the threat to their own legitimacy which could arise if a country under their tutelage, such as Poland, were to remove itself from this position of subservience. This possibility threatens both the expansionist tendencies which have long been present in the Russian and Soviet experience as well as the legitimacy of the current government. Robert W. Tucker has recently written that the Soviet leaders could not "assume that development leading to the loss of their empire in Europe could be kept from endangering the structure of power within the Soviet Union itself."¹⁵⁸ The close relationship of several of these stakes is becoming evident. Ideological security, influence in the Eurocommunist parties, and legitimacy are tightly bound and cannot be solved by the same single simple stroke.

¹⁵⁷ Time, 2 March 1981, p. 40.

¹⁵⁸ Robert W. Tucker, "Trading Poland for the Gulf," Harpers, April 1981, p. 18.

The Soviets also have two physical security problems. The first arises with their involvement in Afghanistan, but this involvement seems limited in a relative sense. While they will be forced to maintain forces there, the psychological dimension of being tied down in that country will be far more important than the military dimension. Without denying the significant adversities which they are facing in that country, they seem to be willing to accept the status quo in that country at least as long as other important issues remain tabled. The Soviets second physical security problem lies with China. Chinese military reaction is certainly feared, but the potential improvement of Chinese-US ties, including a major initiative to strengthen the Chinese military with US assistance must be regarded as a more realistic outcome and a significant development because of the unappreciated Soviet sensitivity to the Chinese.

One of the last competing stakes the Soviets have to lose has already been highlighted, although in a different manner. It has been argued that Soviet global strategy includes driving a wedge between the US and its West European allies. In recent years, this wedge has become very pronounced, as was evidenced by the discussion of the

selective detente. Soviet intervention in Poland would do more to drive the Europeans back under the leadership of the US than anything else they could do. Unlike the quick resumption of the SALT talks following the 1968 Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia, the effects of this move today can be expected to last much longer.

E. SUMMARY

Surveying the discussion of the chapter so far, we see that there are many important stakes involved. The Soviets will be unable to gain one group without placing another group in jeopardy. As the Soviets approach the decision in Poland they are presented with many high stakes both for and against intervention. Just what and how do the stakes and costs line up?

Recapitulation of Stakes¹⁵⁹

<u>For Intervention/</u>										<u>Against Intervention</u>									
Term										Term									
Long /Short										Long /Short									
x	.	x	Warsaw Pact									
		x	CMEA	x
?	Party control									
x	Ideology									
		x	Economic Management									
Spillover into Eastern Europe																			
?	Spillover into the USSR									
										Security, Afghanistan	x
										Security, China	?
x	Security, Ideological									
										Detente	x
										Economic Plight	x
										Eurocommunism	x
x	Legitimacy									
										SALT II	?
										US/West Europe Split	x

47+25 --3--

27+25 --4--

Table 1 reflects the situation in late May, 1981, and must be read carefully. Conclusions drawn from a comparison of short and long term reasons should be mixed very carefully. The questions of party control seems to be one key. A second key appears to be the balance which exists between the arguments for and against intervention. Further

¹⁵⁹ For discussions of spillover into Eastern Europe, see pp. 103 and 175.

discussion of this recapitulation occurs in the next two chapters.

V. SOVIET REACTIONS

In the pursuit of greater understanding of future Soviet actions towards Poland, this analysis first looked at the reality, as clearly as it is currently understood, of Poland. It then traced the historical relationship of the two countries to one another. In the last chapter, it asked what, from the Soviet perspective, was put at risk by the current state of affairs in Poland. However, before projecting Soviet behaviour into the future, a fourth dimension must be added to this analysis. This dimension addresses Soviet reaction to the current crisis. What has been the nature of their interaction and response to this crisis? What capabilities do they have with which they may respond? What measures have the Soviets adopted thus far in response to the crisis? Is there a trend in these responses?¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ It is almost trite to note that Western understanding of the Soviet positions is extremely limited by the closed nature of their system. In an unclassified survey, one is therefore, left with a limited number of tools. These include: detecting and recording significant events, such as trips and grants; carefully weighing statements given by Soviets in a variety of audiences; and reviewing Soviet news reports, which are also made for a variety of audiences. A final source are the statements and actions made by the East Europeans themselves. This is a shaky foundation to use, but it is the only one available.

A. POLAND REARS ITS TROUBLESOME HEAD

Strikes in Poland began on July 1, but it was not until mid-August that the nature of these strikes became extremely serious. Soviet reaction revealed alarm and an understandable sensitivity. More curious was their apparent indecision; the press was silent until August 19 and no meetings between Soviet officials and Westerners were conducted during this period. Without clear direction of their own, they apparently decided to support Polish government initiatives. While already accusing others of attempting to use the situation for "revanchist" aims. One American diplomat likened the Soviet response during this period to a group of men "wringing their hands in embarrassment."

The first action the Soviets took in response to the crisis was the announcement on August 14, of the scheduled dates for the Brotherhood-in-Arms military exercise. While this exercise was planned previously, its announcement necessarily took on political overtones. On the fifteenth, the Soviets published a book of Gierek's works which "detailed the socialist building of Poland." Not until the nineteenth were the first work stoppages reported by Moscow. On the following day, Russian language broadcasts of Voice

of America, British Broadcasting Corporation, and Deutsche Welle began to be jammed.¹⁶¹ Soviet reporting became more animated on August 25 when changes in the political leadership of Poland occurred. On the next day, one Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman was forced into making the first official Soviet statement. The Polish problems he said were "purely an internal affair."¹⁶² The Soviet position was most definitively given by Brezhnev in a speech on August 28. "We shall always know how to stand up for our rights and legitimate interests."¹⁶³ Limited use of the military instrument during this time was probably due to the practical impossibility of achieving a solution by its use due to the widespread nature of the strikes, especially when compounded by lack of time for thorough planning.

East European reactions throughout the period varied. Yugoslavia and Hungary remained calm while Romania wondered from whom the strikers wished to be "independent"; this may have been a reflection of concern caused by strikes which occurred in their own country on 16 and 18 August. The GDR,

¹⁶¹ Ironically, not since the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia had Deutsche Welle been jammed.

¹⁶² AFP (Paris), 26 August 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 27 August 1980, p. P-1.

¹⁶³ Moscow Domestic Service, 28 August 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 2 September 1980, p. R-5.

revealed its hardline perspective at the outset, already speaking of the "internationalistic duty" of the East German armed forces on August 24.¹⁶⁴

1. 30 August - 6 September

The conclusion of the oldest strikes in the Northern ports on 30 August allowed the Soviets to identify those who were responsible. At one level, they seemed to blame anti-socialist forces for inflicting what they called direct damage to real socialism. On September 1, only two days after signing of the Gdansk agreements, the semi-official Alexei Petrov editorial in Pravda spoke to another level. He identified further responsible parties. The editorial bore some implicit criticism of the PUWP leadership while it grudgingly accepted the solution they had arrived at, and finally, it warned the leadership to limit further concessions.¹⁶⁵ The most significant East European reaction came from the GDR when Honecker cancelled a meeting with Schmidt, without explanation, for a second time.

¹⁶⁴ New York Times, 24 August 1980.

¹⁶⁵ Studium News Abstracts, No. 4, October 1980, p. 8.

B. AUTUMN 1980

1. September

With the end of the month of August and the conclusion of its dramatic events, the Poles sat down and began to address the many recently promised reforms. It was from this same period that sprang a three-pronged Soviet program which has continued consistently since then. The first element of this program provides for support of the existing regime, the second seeks to influence the internal developments in Poland, and the last seeks to isolate Poland from its neighbors.

The Soviets demonstrated their support of the new Polish regime when Polish Deputy Premier Jagielski flew to Moscow for meetings on 12-14 September. His first major accomplishment was to receive promises of economic support in the form of food and limited amount of funds (\$150 million). While he was there, he also met with Suslov and Brezhnev. It can be surmised that the Soviets were seeking to find out what was happening in Poland from a Polish leader while at the same time demonstrating their support through the very fact that the meeting occurred.

The Soviets also sought to influence the events in Poland and support the regime with the conduct of the

Brotherhood-in-Arms military exercise. It began on September 9 and was continuing as late as September 20 and included the largest maneuvers in the WTO in the last ten years. In many respects, these exercises were rehearsals for the possibility of a later intervention. These Soviet attempts were successful in displaying Soviet support for the regime, but they were of only questionable success in influencing future events within Poland as was witnessed by the broadcast on September 21 of the first live Catholic service.

Moscow's perception of what was happening in Poland was apparently bifurcated. On the one hand, there was the perception of a return to normalcy. Brezhnev spoke at the time of his confidence that the Poles would solve their problems "within a short time."¹⁶⁶ On the other hand, the Soviets also perceived great danger. KOR was attacked and the imperialists, both internal and external to Poland, were charged with impeding the return to normalcy. Can this Soviet bifurcation be attributed to wishful thinking? In the opinion of the author, it is not. It is more likely that the conclusion of the strikes and the de facto and de

¹⁶⁶ Moscow Domestic Service, 6 September 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 8 September 1980, p. F-10.

jura settlements with which the Soviets were not terribly satisfied, allowed increased emphasis on other important events in the international environment while it allowed a less than totally satisfactory situation to continue in Poland. The Soviet stake in Germany lent great importance to the Germans elections, scheduled for October 4, and in which a strong right wing candidate, Franz Josef Strauss, was in the running. Nor should the US elections be forgotten. To a somewhat smaller extent, the Madrid conference may also have contributed to Soviet reticence to intervene in Poland. Further evidence against the wishful thinking argument is a comment by a Polish Central Committee member. "We know that some comrades in the Soviet Union do not like our ideas, but others are watching our efforts with great interest."¹⁶⁷

The initial Soviet reaction which reflected a return to normalcy began to take on an edgy quality towards the end of September as Soviet sensitivity over the qualities of the emerging trade unions, which implicitly challenged the Soviet system, became apparent. As the Poles prepared to

¹⁶⁷ L'Unita, 10 September 1980, in Soviet World Outlook, 15 October 1980, p. 6.

approve the first charters, the Soviets spoke in Pravda of Lenin's views of trade unions.¹⁶⁸

While the Soviets adopted a moderate approach towards the events in Poland at this early date, some of the East Europeans continued with their strident line which had started even in the midst of the strikes. Czechoslovakia detained members of its Charter 77 dissident organization and charged that antisocialist forces were hiding behind the shield of necessary reform. They added that they could not be indifferent to the events and stressed that they were loyal allies. The GDR statements focused on "revanchist" West Germany but the GDR also sent to Poland market commodities with a value of \$150 million above those called for in the existing CMEA agreements. The Germans continued to see dangerous signs. September was largely a month for the world and the Soviet bloc to catch its breath and to consider the future.

2. October

The quiet of September was marked at the beginning of October by the registration of the first trade union. The third prong in the Soviet campaign, the isolation of

¹⁶⁸ "V. I. Lenin on the Trade Unions," Pravda (Moscow), 28 September 1980, p. 2, in FBIS-USSR, 30 September 1980, p. BB-1.

Poland, now became evident. Polish newspapers were banned in Lithuania in early October and portions of the Soviet-Polish border were closed. The East Germans placed severe travel restrictions on travelers crossing its border with Poland. In this manner, much of Poland was sealed to international travel.

The Soviet perception of the events in Poland and their satisfaction, or lack thereof, of the unfolding events was revealed in their domestic reports carrying the text of Kania's October 4 speech. These copies of his speech failed to include his call for a redefinition of the responsibilities and working relationships between the party First Secretary and the government Premier. The theme of the dichotomous thread continued and was perhaps became even deeper. On the same day as Kania's speech, Georgi Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute, was quoted as saying that he saw the foundation of Poland being "solid and firm."¹⁶⁹ While this may only be a fluke which arose from the lack of comprehension or poor communication, a statement made a week later by Lt Gen Lushnichenko, head of the Political Command

¹⁶⁹ New York Times, 5 October 1980, p. E-3.

of the Northern Group of Soviet Armed Forces, revealed a similar estimate of the situation existing in Poland.¹⁷⁰ He did not, of course, fail to add that the Northern Group of forces were well aware of the complicated character of the present times and of the weight and responsibility for the tasks involved in defending the Western approaches of the community. During October, military units were reported to be moving around Poland.

Many of the events related above occurred early in the month. As the month progressed, tensions had been growing. On 20 October, Gromyko made a trip to Warsaw. Two days after his unannounced visit the charter for Solidarity was approved after much wrangling within Poland. This could not have occurred without some kind of tacit support or approval from the Soviets. The month of October closed on the thirtieth with a delegation of high ranking Poles visiting Moscow.

While the Soviets saw both normalcy and danger, the East European hard-liners did not. Czechoslovakia saw "counter-revolution" already underway and the GDR, whose attentions had lately been directed more towards the FRG,

¹⁷⁰ "Meetings, Speeches Mark Army Day Celebrations," Zolnierz Wolnosci (Warsaw), 11-12 October 1980, p. 2, in FBIS-EEU, 22 October 1980, p. G-17.

redirected their attention to Poland. They called the existing situation "most serious" and volunteered that "friends ensure socialism."¹⁷¹ Moderate Hungary began showing expected signs of sensitivity over its own reforms. In an article on the Hungarian economic model, words and phrases like "methods" and "reply to reality" were substituted for "model" in an attempt to avoid drawing excessive Soviet attention.¹⁷²

In October, rising tensions caused the Soviet program of support for the regime, influencing the internal developments and isolating Poland met with mixed results. Attempts to influence internal developments were clearly overridden by the approval of Solidarity's charter on 22 October and the aforementioned gain by reformers in the Polish leadership.

3. November

During November the Soviets made the largest commitment yet in support of the Polish regime with a \$1.1 billion loan to them. Efforts to physically isolate the Polish contagion were completed on November 13 when

¹⁷¹ ADN (East Berlin), 30 October 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 31 October 1980, p. E-2, and ADN (East Berlin), 13 October 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 16 October 1980, p. E-5.

¹⁷² "Vienna Die Presse Interviews MSZMP Ideologist Aczel," Die Presse (Vienna), 27 October 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 29 October 1980, p. F-2.

Czechoslovakia placed stringent new restrictions on travel across the border of the two countries. Soviet perceptions of the events in Poland shifted during mid-November. This shift was foreshadowed by Romanian President Nicolai Ceascescu's 4 November comments in which he argued that the time for appropriate action had been missed.¹⁷³ The implicit criticism of the USSR was perceived by them and evidenced in their failure to rebroadcast this portion of his speech. From the middle of November, events begin an exponential climb in both their quality and quantity. On November 12, Paris Match, a French magazine, published a poll of 510 Poles.¹⁷⁴ In this poll they found that 66% of the Poles were willing to fight for Polish independence while only 3%, the stalwart members of the Communist Party, supported the existing regime. A period of three to four weeks of tension started concurrently with the publication of this poll. Soviet statements during the latter portion of the month revealed a subtle shift in their perceptions. While the Poles were still portrayed supporting the system, there was

¹⁷³ "Kremlin Observes Discretion at Present Stage of Polish Crisis," Le Monde (Paris), 4 November 1980, p. 10, in FBIS-USSR, 6 November 1980, p. F-2.

¹⁷⁴ Christian Science Monitor, 14 November 1980.

no longer evidence that the system was returning to a state of normalcy.

Soviet propaganda was sorely challenged by this poll but it persisted on its original track. Leonid Zamyatin, a member of the Supreme Soviet's Foreign Affairs Committee, disputed the poll in a TV interview given in the USSR on the fifteenth.¹⁷⁵ Other analysts have interpreted this interview to be tough. Zamyatin noted anti-socialist ties of a few with the West and argued that a majority continued to support the system. However, in another interview conducted two weeks later, this so-called tough stance was moderated by his additional acknowledgement that the situation in Poland was complicated.¹⁷⁶ Events in Poland continued to accelerate. The Polish secret police raid on trade union quarters which found state secrets occurred on November 21. On the 22, an avowed Catholic was elevated to the position of Deputy Premier and on 25 November a strike occurred in a tractor factory. Two days later a national strike alert was called.

¹⁷⁵ TASS (Moscow), "Studio Nine," 15 November 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 17 November 1980, p. CC-8.

¹⁷⁶ Prague Domestic TV Service, 27 November 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 1 December 1980, p. CC-11.

As these events occurred, East European comment became more acerbic. Czechoslovakia continued to paint a picture of the imminent loss of Poland to the West. Conditional credit assistance offered by the West was "blatant interference."¹⁷⁷ Finally, Solidarity was an opposition force which caused a "feverish state and threatened the "destruction of the entire social organism."¹⁷⁸ By the end of November, they were noting deliberate acts of sabotage at factories and other signs of collapse. Czechoslovak anxiety was echoed by the GDR. Walesa was a "rabid" person holding "anti-communist views."¹⁷⁹ They went so far as to quote the Czech report on the destruction of the social organism. In contrast, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Hungary remained much calmer. In one of the more incisive analyses, Yugoslav writers noted at mid-month that the Polish historical compromise might not be aimed at overthrowing the system.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ "A Note: What They Are Aiming at," Rude Pravo (Prague), 19 November 1980, p. 7, in FBIS-EEU, 24 November 1980, p. D-1.

¹⁷⁸ "State Power Weakening," Rude Pravo (Prague), 28 November 1980, p. 7, in FBIS-EEU, 2 December 1980, p. D-1.

¹⁷⁹ "Informative Confessions in an FRG Illustrated Magazine," Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 22-23 November 1980, p. 5, in FBIS-EEU, 25 November 1980, p. E-1.

¹⁸⁰ "Martinovic Says Polish Solidarity 'Resting' Its Authority," Borba (Zagreb), 14 November 1980, p. 7, in FBIS-EEU, 20 November 1980, p. I-1.

Soviet and Warsaw Pact preparations had continued since the Brotherhood-in-Arms exercise held in September but now in November, increased activity was noted. A temporary restricted area (TRA) was proclaimed in the GDR across a forty kilometer area for the period 29 November - 9 December. These military preparations were accompanied by attempts to preclude what was considered to be an otherwise inevitable event. News of inter-training with Polish military units was carried in Krasnaya Zvezda, the Soviet military daily, on 29 November. The moderate reactions of September and October became clouded and revealed great sensitivity in November.

4. A Decision to Intervene: The First Iteration

The events of the first week of December were surrounded in a cloud of confusion. Study of these events renders valuable insight into the Soviet Politburo and the role of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Bloc. Late in November, the Soviets appear to have made a decision to intervene. Signs of active planning became evident only during this period. This late November decision to intervene is reflected in a variety of ways. On 29 November Senator Charles Percy was closely questioned by Brezhnev, Suslov, and Gromyko while on a trip to the Soviet Union. The

attention displayed in and by these conversations leaves one with the view that more than the new US President was on the minds of the Soviet leaders. Did the Soviets, hope through these discussions, to glean information about official American attitudes towards Soviet intervention? On November 25, the Soviets made their first statements which noted concern over the security and national interests affected by the upcoming nationwide Polish strikes.¹⁸¹ Between 25 and 30 November, commentaries coming forth remained mixed. Gierek made a curious visit to the Soviet Union between 28 November and 5 December.¹⁸²

By the thirtieth, Soviet media had stabilized on a line that seemed to indicate preparation of the Soviet populace for an intervention. Radio Moscow noted that broad circles of Polish society were concerned about the crisis in Poland and quoted the Polish press in saying that the Polish authorities had in the past few days been receiving resolutions and decisions from social organizations and trade union groups expressing deep concern about the current situation.¹⁸³ On November 30, Vilnius, the capital of

¹⁸¹ Radio Liberty 455/80, 2 December 1980, p. 1.

¹⁸² "Alarmist Tone in Warsaw," Le Monde (Paris), 5 December 1980, pp. 1,3, in FBIS-EEU, 5 December 1980, p. G-4.

¹⁸³ Radio Liberty 456/80, 30 November 1980, p. 7.

Lithuania was unexpectedly closed to foreign visitors. On December 2, the entire GDR-Polish border was closed. On 3 December, the GDR mobilization was confirmed by both Bonn and Washington. On that same day, Soviet forces in position around Poland went on alert. Other indications of a high state of military preparedness included the forward relocation of command posts, the stockpiling of ammunition and fuel, the establishment of mobile field hospitals, and the callup of reserves.¹⁸⁴

There is further evidence that this decision had been only recently taken. The Soviets rely on gold sales to provide a major source of their hard currency, but as late as October, they were still engaged in heavy gold trading.¹⁸⁵ Because gold habitually increases in value after events such as the one under discussion, it would have been logical for them to hold up these sales if intervention had been a under serious consideration only a short time earlier. These gold sales had only recommenced, after an absence of a year, in September.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Washington Star, 18 December 1980.

¹⁸⁵ "Big Soviet Gold Transfer to Zurich," Financial Times, 20 November 1980, p. 2, in FBIS-USSR, 16 December 1980, Annex.

¹⁸⁶ The Soviets evidenced a sharp market sense previously when they bought unusually high quantities of cobalt immediately prior to the invasion of Shaba, a major source of that mineral.

A second piece of evidence supporting the short-term nature of this decision comes from the change of command of two senior Soviet commanders in the Warsaw Pact. The commanders of both the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia and of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany were rotated between the third and the fifth of December. These rotations could easily have been postponed if intervention had been considered more probable only a short time earlier, before the plans for their rotations were widespread knowledge. That they occurred may be explained by Soviet confidence or deception. Neither of these arguments are strong by themselves.

Another explanation for their replacement can also be made. It arises from the dates of their rotations. This author believes that between 3 and 5 December, the Soviets may have been persuaded not to intervene. Reports emerging since that time have indicated that Hungary and Romania pressured the USSR into a postponement of the verdict at the December 5 meeting,¹⁸⁷ but the decision was more likely taken prior to the meeting. It has been reported that President Ceausescu did not decide to attend the conference

¹⁸⁷ "Warsaw Pact Will Decide in Moscow How to 'Restore Order'," Corriere Della Sera (Milan), 4 February 1981, p. 4.

until after Brezhnev assured him that he would not be present at a meeting which would ratify the intervention which Ceausescu opposed.¹⁸⁸ Other evidence is also present to support the contention that the 5 December meeting was not set to ratify intervention. One is the fact that the Poles were also in attendance at the latter meeting. Had a decision to intervene been anticipated, it is highly unlikely that they would have been in attendance.

The East European leaders were able to influence and reverse the Soviet decision because of a deeper division within the Soviet Politburo itself. It has been reported that very influential members of the Politburo were lined up against the principle advocate of intervention, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov. According to his report, Brezhnev did not take sides and no agreement was reached.¹⁸⁹

There is further support for the contention that the 5 December meeting in fact ratified a decision for non-intervention. The careful wording and the even more careful re quoting by all major East European sources of the 5

¹⁸⁸ "Romania's 'Moderating Role' at Summit Noted," Le Monde (Paris), 9 December 1980, p. 3, in FBIS-USSR, 11 December 1980, p. BB-1. It should be noted that a normally scheduled Ministers meeting of the WTO had been conducted during the period 1-3 December in Romania and that this 5 December meeting in Moscow was very impromptu.

¹⁸⁹ Washington Star, 30 December 1980.

December Warsaw Pact communique is remarkable. This communique said in part that the participants

expressed their conviction that Poland's communists, working class and working people would be able to master the existing difficulties and problems and to secure the future development of their country towards socialism. (They) also reaffirmed that socialist Poland, the Polish United Workers Party, and the Polish people may rely on the fraternal assistance of the member-countries of the Warsaw alliance.

That the decision was taken within the Soviet Union prior to the meeting may also have been evidenced by a December 5 article published in the morning edition of Pravda, fully two days after the Polish Plenum. It noted that decisions taken at the plenum would "promote a peaceful atmosphere."¹⁹⁰ This is a major change in tone from the 30 November Radio Moscow report related above.

Evidence that the decision of the fifth was for non-intervention also came out in negative fashions. On the seventh, East German officials were reporting that a number of railroad trains carrying meat from Germany to Poland had been diverted by "rebel" Polish workers.¹⁹¹ The tone of this report gives it the appearance of an attempt to lobby for a decision to intervene. This is implicit evidence that the

¹⁹⁰ "Fraternal Newspapers: At the Center of Attention," Pravda (Moscow), 5 December 1980, p. 5, in FBIS-USSR, 9 December 1980, p. F-1.

¹⁹¹ Washington Star, 7 December 1980.

decision had not yet been taken. Also on the seventh, the Washington Star quoted "a faithful and precise" informant inside the GDR who noted that a military move into Poland would occur within four weeks if the Polish leadership failed to restore its authority.¹⁹²

Unlike the Germans, who on December 7 appeared to be lobbying for a reversal of a decision for non-intervention, on the evening of 5 December, the Czechs broadcast an radio editorial which said that "there do not exist problems that cannot be solved by political means."¹⁹³ As can be expected, this contrasted with the alarmist reports the Czechoslovak press had published during the entire preceding crisis period.

In review, this author feels that several decisions were taken. The first was taken by the Soviets in the last week of November and called for a quick intervention. Certain East Europeans determined that this decision had been made and, capitalizing on a weak Soviet consensus within the Soviet Politburo, caused it to be reversed between 3 and 5 December. This reversal was accepted by the

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Prague Domestic Service, 5 December 1980, in FBIS-EFU, 8 December 1980, p. AA-2.

Soviets before the Warsaw Pact meeting and ratified at the meeting.

5. A Decision to Intervene: A Second Iteration

December 6, as has been noted, marks a sudden shift in the signs and signals which the Soviets were sending. On that day, both Krasnaya Zvezda the Soviet military daily, and Pravda revealed a significantly new tone. The military journal reported that the USSR-Polish relations were noted by "good neighborliness" and the Moscow radio report on the Polish plenum was unemotive in the manner in which it spoke of the constructive nature of Kania's efforts.¹⁹⁴

But two pieces of good evidence indicate that the 5 December decision did not stand for long. The first comes from a London Times article which reported the release of Swedish intelligence from the December time period.¹⁹⁵ The report maintains that on December 6, an unusual amount of Soviet military shipping was observed in the Baltic. Between 7 and 9 December, three divisions were moved from garrison locations to tents in the vicinity of Kaliningrad and that

¹⁹⁴ "Foreign Publicist in Krasnaya Zvezda: Our Close Combat Alliance," Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 6 December 1980, p. 3, in FBIS-USSR, 9 December 1980, p. F-3, and Moscow Domestic Service, 6 December 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 8 December 1980, p. F-3.

¹⁹⁵ "Swedes Surprised that West Did Not Notice Worst Threat to Poland," The Times (London), 6 April 1981, p. 4.

during that time a direct radio communications link was set up with Moscow. This report is corroborated by Brzezinski's statement that the US learned on December 7 of an impending movement of a Soviet airborne division into Poland.¹⁹⁶ Brzezinski added that in response to this knowledge, President Carter sent a stern message to Brezhnev and the Times report noted a sudden halt of preparations on 9 December.

This seems to offer indisputable evidence that the Soviets were planning for intervention sometime after the fifth. Did this reflect one decision which was never altered, one which was never taken, or, as argued, two decisions which were both cancelled. The evidence is not clear. Jiri Valenta argued that the Soviet decision to move into Czechoslovakia was taken only three days before the operation.¹⁹⁷ This further supports the argument that two decisions were taken. History makes it clear that both were cancelled. Regardless of which interpretation is favored, the perspective that one gains of the Soviet Politburo during this time is one of weakness and indecision. This is

¹⁹⁶ San Francisco Chronicle, 2 February 1981.

¹⁹⁷ Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 145.

the same indecision that was noted during the August strikes and is important to the future analysis. It clearly indicates that the Warsaw Pact collectivity and the Soviet Politburo was giving the Poles the chance to solve their own problem again. Certainly, a variety of military actions taken during this period serve to induce firmer actions on the Polish communists and may have intimidated the Polish workers for a period of time.

C. WINTER 1980-1981

1. December

The Soviet attitudes during the balance of December are distinct from those of the preceeding two weeks and are subject to less interpretation. Between 11 and 20 December, there were numerous attempts to calm the international environment. Most of this calming was accomplished through interviews of ranking Soviet officials conducted in the West. On the eleventh, Vadim Zagladin gave an interview in Rome and Soviet Ambassador K. Chervonenko gave one in France. On December 14, Boris Ponomarev, Central Committee secretary overseeing the International Department, gave another one in France followed on the fifteenth by Soviet Ambassador Valentin Falin's in the FRG. The final one was

granted by Zamyatin in Helsinki on the 20. In each of these, the same theme was apparent. The Soviet Union was supporting the Polish solution to the Polish problem.

During this period there was a resurgence in the economic support of the CMEA to Poland. On December 16, Soviet radio quoted the Polish newspaper Tribuna Ludu, when it noted that all the CMEA countries had announced a speedup of trade deliveries to Poland.¹⁹⁸ Starting on the December 12, Soviet reports noted the return of rhythm to the Polish workplace.¹⁹⁹ This new attitude was clear by 25 December when the Moscow World Service noted that "commonsense, constructive attitudes and realism are gradually gaining the upper hand in Poland."²⁰⁰ Similar to their September reactions was the reemergence at this time of discussions of competing stakes in their propaganda. This was most notable in the Soviet attempts to split the US from its allies. It came at the same time that the US was attempting to provide leadership to its allies in the event of possible Soviet intervention. Attacks accused the US of being responsible

¹⁹⁸ Moscow World Service, 16 December 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 17 December 1980, p. F-2.

¹⁹⁹ Moscow Domestic Service, 12 December 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 12 December 1980, p. F-4.

²⁰⁰ Moscow World Service, 25 December 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 29 December 1980, p. F-5.

for "whipping up an attitude of hysteria and noted that the reasons for the disturbance in Poland were all due to western generated agitation."²⁰¹

Finally, Soviet attitudes in this period included an acceptance of the Polish situation . The Soviets seem to have erased their old line and redrawn it to include Solidarity. Zagladin gave evidence to this view when he wrote that the Soviet Union "denies that Solidarity deviates from the socialist system." This may have been due in part to another growing Soviet perception also confirmed by Leonid Zamyatin. The Soviets understood that "the economic and social problems now affecting Poland could hit any other country."²⁰² Implicit in this understanding is recognition that the Soviets do not have the military forces sufficient to garrison the whole of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Perhaps they are being forced to recognize that some reform is an absolute necessity.

Soviet attitudes during the balance of December reflected a reversal away from the increasing tension levels

²⁰¹ Moscow Domestic Service, 9 December 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 10 December 1980, p. A-1, and "Military Political Review: Cold Winds over Europe," Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 28 December 1980, p. 3, in FBIS-USSR, 30 December 1980, p. CC-12-14.

²⁰² "Zamyatin: Bitter Experience of Inimical Government," Hufvudstadsbladet (Helsinki), 20 December 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 31 December 1980, p. CC-6.

which started in September, continued through October and accelerated through November into early December. The changeover did not occur uniformly throughout the decision-making hierarchy. On December 10, Ustinov called for a raising of vigilance against the aspirations of imperialist forces.²⁰³ Coming immediately before the 11-20 December international campaign related above, and after the sudden halt of preparations on 9 December, it appears to give evidence to the fact that the Soviet military was indeed a proponent of intervention and was slow in accepting the political decision ratified at the Warsaw Pact meeting.

A second military occurrence after the fifth, was the continued staffing of the Polish armed forces by Soviet officers including those in the Ministry of Defense. Some of these officers wore Polish military uniforms in an effort to maintain a low profile and in some respects, this was a subtle but sure form of intervention.²⁰⁴ Another unique and new quality was the announcement during this period of a

²⁰³ TASS International Service(Moscow), 10 December 1980, in FBIS-USSR, 11 December 1980, p. V-1.

²⁰⁴ "Soviet 'Advisors' with Polish Army Reported," Valeurs Actuelles(Paris), 29 December 1980, p. 10, in FBIS-EU, 13 January 1981, Annex.

military exercise which never occurred, or occurred only in a much smaller scale than reported.²⁰⁵

December was noted by a Soviet reacceptance of the Solidarity trade union in particular and the Polish situation in general, a willingness to find a new solution originally not of their liking, and giving some evidence of bureaucratic politics within the Soviet decision making hierarchy, more specifically, of the lack of consensus within the Politburo.

2. January

In Poland, the peace of December was followed, in January, by a dispute over the implementation of the provision of work on Saturdays. This dispute was the center of Soviet comment during the month, but the Soviets continued to support Poland. Deputy Premier Jagielski went to Moscow to celebrate the new year by receiving a \$465 million package of assistance from the Soviets and Brezhnev made a statement in which he expressed hope that the task to overcome the present difficulties would be fulfilled under the leadership of the PUWP.

²⁰⁵ Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report/304, 18 December 1980, p. 3.

Other January themes were not as positive, however. Against the increasing rhythm and heightened activities noted at the end of December and the beginning of January there was a growing threat of counterrevolution. The expressions "healthy forces," and "anti-socialist forces against the state" were used with increasing regularity.²⁰⁶ At the beginning of January, reports on Solidarity carefully drew the distinction between it and the anti-socialist forces who used it as a cover.²⁰⁷ However, the trade union's strong advocacy of Saturday work recast it in the Soviet minds into the chief perpetrator of the aggravation. In fact, the bid to aggravate this situation proved to the Soviets, as they said, that Solidarity was not part of the solution.²⁰⁸

Soviet concern was evidenced when Marshall Victor G. Kulikov, the Soviet WTO Commander, made a surprise visit to Warsaw on January 13. Following his meeting with Kania, he dropped out of sight leading to speculation that he was conferring with military leaders. Gen. Anotoly I. Gribkov,

²⁰⁶ "Bajalski Reports Soviet Reaction to Polish Events," Politika (Belgrade), 9 January 1981, p. 1-2, in FBIS-EEU, 13 January 1981, p. I-1.

²⁰⁷ "Provocative Demands," TASS (Moscow), 1 January 1981, in FBIS-USSR, 2 January 1981, p. F-1.

²⁰⁸ Moscow World Service, 23 January 1981.

Chief of Staff of the WTO, and Gen. Afanasi F. Schleglov, commander of Soviet forces in Western Poland, were seen in public with him during his visit.

Finally, Western interference continued to be a theme of Soviet propaganda. It may have reflected the Soviets true perceptions. Articles referred to work done by Brzezinski during the 1960's as a long-term plan being used by the US to undermine Soviet strength in the Eastern Bloc.²⁰⁹ The US was not the only country in the West responsible for interfering in Polish affairs. The British were also targeted for their complicity in helping an emigre organization in London.

The East European press was different from the Soviet press only in that it continued to be more vitriolic. The Czechs continued to be extremely negative while the GDR chose to remind the Poles of the debt they had to the Soviets whose troops had liberated their country at the end of WWII. Conversely, Yugoslavia maintained its much more rational and cautious approach while noting that Polish party members were expressing concern over the continuing tension in Poland.

²⁰⁹ Moscow, shortwave to Hungary, 3 January 1981, in FBIS-USSR, 5 January 1981, p. F-1.

Soviet military operations showed some decrease in the readiness, but Soviet military preparedness continued to be evidenced by better shelter for the troops, a staff exercise with the Hungarians, and another small exercise which was given publicity much in excess of its size. Gen. A. A. Yepishev, the chief of the Main Political Directorate for the Soviet armed forces, was quoted on January 16 as saying that reactionary imperialist circles were trying to disrupt the prevailing balance of power within Poland.²¹⁰

In January, the Soviets became disturbed with the new line of tolerance which they had made in December and which had included Solidarity. Their magnanimity of December could only continue in a period of Polish social peace. When this started slipping during the month, their tolerance also slipped. The end of January found the Soviets increasingly concerned, East Europe continuing to attack, and bureaucratic political advocates of firmness now making public speeches.

3. February

February opened to a serious situation. The Soviets had the constraint of 26th Party Congress, scheduled for

²¹⁰ "Taking the Lead and Showing Leadership: Party Conferences," Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 16 January 1981, p. 2, in FBIS-USSR, 26 January 1981, p. BB-4.

February 26, with which to concern themselves and yet Poland was experiencing serious social disruptions as Solidarity protested against slow enactment of the Gdansk agreements. The GDR clamored about falling Polish exports disturbing the CMEA production plans. The Czechs were emphasizing the heavy handed ways of Solidarity and quoting Poles who wrote that the situation was deteriorating.

The Soviets maintained twenty six divisions on alert status around Poland and on the ninth, sent a clear message that their patience was not infinite when the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany, Petr Abrasimov, warned that the USSR could not remain indifferent to the current events which included observations that dual power was becoming a reality in Poland. Soviet dissatisfaction was also displayed in their much delayed first use of a Polish government document published on November 25 which detailed the role of the centers of foreign subversion who are "carrying out psychological warfare "against socialist countries.²¹¹ A Literaturnaya Gazeta article also portrayed

²¹¹ TASS (Moscow), 7 February 1981, in FBIS-USSR, 9 February 1981, p. F-3.

the Western interference in Poland's extreme difficulties in very base terms.²¹² TASS properly summarized the Soviet fears in this regard by noting that "counter revolutionary forces are actually starting a frontal attack on party."²¹³

The situation in Poland took on a new hue with Kania's appointment of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski as the new Premier on 12 February. Soviet acquiescence but not firm support greeted his appointment, however, Soviet attitudes once again siezed on the hope that the Polish situation was not yet out of control. Solidarity's ratification of Jaruzelski's call for a three month moratorium on strikes gave them some reason for their positive attitudes.

East European activities were not in full unison. On the fourteenth, the Bulgarians offered fraternal support and international assistance.²¹⁴ Czechoslovakia spoke of Poland as a "Trojan horse,"²¹⁵ and the GDR continued its its strong rhetoric. It was "horrified" at the "yielding

²¹² "Behind the Mask of 'Solidarity'," Literaturnaya Gazeta (Moscow), 11 February 1981, p. 9, 14, in FBIS-USSR, 19 February 1981, p. F-7.

²¹³ TASS (Moscow), 6 February 1981, in FBIS-USSR, 9 February 1981, p. F-1.

²¹⁴ "International Weekly Review: Appeals for Calm and Resolute Struggle against Antisocialist Forces in Poland," Narodna Armiya (Sofia), 14 February 1981, p. 3, in FBIS-EEU, 19 February 1981, p. C-9.

²¹⁵ "Against Poland's Enemies," Zemedejske Noviny (Prague), 14 February 1981, p. 2, in FBIS-EEU, 18 February 1980, p. D-8.

attitudes of the Polish authorities."²¹⁶ On February 13, they demonstrated their dissatisfaction by practicing river crossings on the Neisse River at the Polish border. Kania made trips in late February to reassure Gustav Husak (CZ) and Erich Honecker (GDR) and to gain the time he needed to reestablish firm control over Poland.

4. March

March started quietly as Polish workers returned to their jobs. Again, the Soviets noted that industrial production was gradually returning to normal. On March 6, Soviet leaders expressed confidence that "the Polish communists have every opportunity and are strong enough to eliminate the dangers to their socialist gains." On March 12, the Soviets were still reporting that the situation in Poland was normalizing. They went on to add that it would take years of intensive work to rebuild Poland. The Soviets also seemed to again view Solidarity, in its basic nature, as an acceptable feature in a communist system. Through mid-March, the Soviet concern sprang from the long-term significance of the Polish events. Poland was quiet enough

²¹⁶ DPA (Hamburg), 20 February 1981, in FBIS-EEU, 20 February 1981, p. E-1.

that no discussion of it was included in the Soviet TV news shows of mid-March.

5. Soyuz 81

But against the background of these statements were the upcoming Soyuz 81 military exercises. A large meeting of military commanders of the GDR and USSR took place in Moscow between the 5 and the 8th.²¹⁷ Senior officials in attendance were Ustinov, Yepishev, Kulikov, and Marshal Ogarkov from the USSR and Gen. Heinz Hoffmann and Col Gen Heinz Kessler from the GDR. The Soyuz exercises were announced on 10 March. They were planned as a "joint headquarters exercise of the allied armies and air forces" and "sought to improve coordination and work out questions of cooperation between the superior headquarters of the fraternal countries."²¹⁸

The relative calm of early March was shattered two days after the exercises started when protesting farmers were beaten in the town of Bydgoszcz on 19 March. The tension this produced lead directly to another serious military scare. Soyuz 81, announced as largely command and

²¹⁷ "Friendly Meeting," Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 6 March 1981, p. 1, in FBIS-USSR, 11 March 1981, p. F-2.

²¹⁸ Moscow Domestic Service, 10 March 1981, in FBIS-USSR, 11 March 1981, p. BB-1.

staff exercises, in fact, took on the appearance of a dress rehearsal for a future intervention. Between 17 March and 7 April, a wide variety of maneuvers were held. East German forces conducted advances to contact which closely matched their anticipated future actions. By both day and night, they advanced forty kilometers, including making a water obstacle crossing (100 meters), and then met an enemy who offered stiff resistance.²¹⁹ In other exercises, Polish and East German airborne forces simulated landings on the Baltic.²²⁰ Some were conducted in the vicinity of Tallinn²²¹ and may have served the dual purpose of demonstrating Soviet resolve to the restless Estonians. (See preceding chapter)

The serious nature of the military exercises were evidenced by the highest military alert called since World War II in Sweden.²²² BBC carried a report on 27 March of a West European intelligence report which claimed that the Soviets had decided in the last several days to intervene. The option was clearly available. A breach of protocol caused the Soviet Warsaw Pact commander, Kulikov, to be

²¹⁹ ADN (East Berlin), 1 April 1981, in FBIS-EEU, 3 April 1981, p. AA-1.

²²⁰ Christian Science Monitor, 31 March 1981.

²²¹ Times (London), 6 April 1981, p. 4.

²²² Christian Science Monitor, 24 March 1981.

named exercise commander. On previous occasions, the commander has come from the host country, in this case, East Germany.²²³ The Soyuz 81 exercises failed to be halted at their expected time. The exercises ran an additional week and even after the Soviet announcement of their successful conclusion, the activities tapered off only very slowly.

6. April

The end of March witnessed Solidarity calling a nationwide strike for April 1 in protest over the events and subsequent to Bydgoszcz. April came early, on the thirtieth of March when Solidarity called off this strike because of the certainty of bloodshed. Later, a Solidarity spokesman was quoted saying that they had heard of a rumor to close the Warsaw airport and had learned that reservists had been recalled to their barracks and that the Polish Transport Company, PKS, had been ordered to prepare buses for what could only have been troop movement. This threat came from the maneuvering troops.²²⁴ The cancellation of the strike seemed, though only slowly, to take the wind from the sails driving the Soviet ship towards intervention.

²²³ New York Times, 27 March 1981.

²²⁴ "Warsaw Threatened a State of Siege," De Volkskrant (Amsterdam), 7 April 1981, in FBIS-EEU, 10 April 1981, p. G-21.

Other Soviet statements from this early April period gave indication to the serious state of affairs. One Pole was quoted saying, "morally, Fascism stands higher than Marxism."²²⁵ Another "Polish" listener "wrote" to a Moscow radio network. "The socialist order must be reestablished quickly if we want to defend our fatherland and socialism."²²⁶ Finally, Izvestia noted that events have recently "proven that the 'creeping counterrevolution' has risen to its feet and attained its full height."²²⁷

On April 5, Brezhnev made a surprise visit to Czechoslovakia to attend their communist party meeting. His speech was moderate in tone, but it contained a subtle shift in attitude. Of Poland, he said in part, "Poland's genuine patriots will be able, one should suppose, to give a necessary rebuff to the schemes of the enemies of the socialist system."²²⁸ The "conviction" of December's Warsaw Pact communique gave way to "one should suppose" in April. But while the certainty of a Polish solution was diminished,

²²⁵ "Anti-Socialist Assemblage," Pravda (Moscow), 2 April 1981, p. 5, in FBIS-USSR, 3 April 1981, p. F-1.

²²⁶ Moscow, in French, 5 April 1981, in FBIS-USSR, 6 April 1981, p. F-10.

²²⁷ "What Next?," Izvestia, 5 April 1981, in FBIS-USSR, 6 April 1981, p. F-7.

²²⁸ Moscow Domestic Service, 7 April 1981, in FBIS-USSR, 7 April 1981, p. F-1. Emphasis added.

the speech was viewed as moderate in view of the fact that the Soyuz 81 maneuvers, which possessed such serious potential, were continuing a week beyond their scheduled conclusion.

While the highest level Soviet statements were showing subtle shifts, changes in East Europe were much more pronounced. In early April, T. Zhivkov, the Bulgarian Communist Party First Secretary, expressed Bulgaria's "fraternal solidarity with all true Polish patriots."²²⁹ For the first time, the Hungarians, the only East European country with a history of friendly relations with Poland, strongly criticized Solidarity and echoed their East German and Czech counterparts.²³⁰

In mid-April, following the conclusion of Soyuz-81, the Soviets were acknowledged to be capable of moving 120,000 men, eight divisions, into Poland within a few hours. They were openly regarded to be capable of committing an additional 100,000 troops, seven divisions, into Poland within one week.²³¹ But the tone of their statements again

²²⁹ "Further Reportage on 12th Bulgarian CP Congress," Pravda (Moscow), 1 April 1981, p. 4, in FBIS-USSR, 6 April 1981, p. F-13.

²³⁰ Nepszabadsag, in Christian Science Monitor, 24 April 1981.

²³¹ Newsweek, 13 April 1981, p. 62.

quieted as April passed and they could be clearly viewed as loosing in their war of nerves with the Poles. It has become apparent that the Soviets gave the Poles a new lease on life in April.

Reviewing the past several months, what trends can be seen? The Soviets have used three threats to keep East Europe in line since WWII.²³² These threats have been political, economic, and military. The military threat is clear, but its success has been less so. Two exercises have been held within Poland. During the last exercise, the Poles held a nationwide 4-hour strike. This leads one to question the capability of this threat to gain any important goals for the Soviets. The Soviet economic threat towards Poland has routinely been, instead, an inducement. When the Soviets have had problems with the Poles in the past, they have extended aid. This pattern has been used frequently since August in this crisis. If the Soviets consider intervention to be inevitable, one might expect them to refrain from extending it much as they did in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But Soviet economic support appears to continue through today. Political threats have also had varying

²³² Korbonski, "Eastern Europe and the Soviet Threat," Academy of Political Science Proceedings 33 (No. 1 1978): 66-76.

success. Political threats include ideological warnings, official visits, and statements. In Poland today, they have failed to prevent the workers contagion from spreading to the party. Thus it is evident that the standard methods of control available to the Soviets have been well exercised and, in the final analysis, have failed.

IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Observers of the present situation in Poland are today presented with a great challenge. No one would dispute that the events in Poland have far exceeded other Eastern Bloc disturbances since World War II and yet, no intervention has occurred. In the absence of a key to future Soviet reactions, what threads have we uncovered which give light to the future events?

A. REVIEW

It appears clear that the events transpiring in Poland will continue. The transformations of the power relationships inside Poland give little evidence of a tendency to return to the status quo ante in the short-term. The pattern of change has maintained its direction and increased in its forcefulness despite strong reactions from the Soviets and their Eastern European neighbors. Ratification of reform proposals which must undoubtedly occur during the July PUWP Congress will substantially bolster these new patterns of relationships. Thus, it is unlikely that the problems in Poland will disappear soon.

The historical survey also makes it clear that the Soviets have a predisposition to intervene founded on years of history and numerous precedents dating to the mid-seventeenth century. Their historical claim to Poland is equally supported, according to their world view, by the cost they bore during the Great Patriotic War (World War II) whose end saw them in control of Poland. No events have yet occurred to lessen any of these claims. Finally, the discussion of the Soviet stakes in Poland makes it clear that the changes occurring there are both serious and diametrically opposed to Soviet desires.

Future Soviet actions in Poland will largely be determined by the events unfolding in Poland, itself. Both the Soviet stakes in Poland, and the costs implicit with Soviet intervention are extremely high while the competing stakes and their associated costs are of less value. This makes it important to focus on the indicators and trends in Poland and the Soviet Union over actions taken by participants elsewhere in the international system. While actions by the latter actors will be important in the long-term by displaying resolve, continuity, stability, and for setting a Western/American example, they will generally have only a small chance of altering the short-term decisions of

the Soviets. With this premise in mind, pessimistic from the American decision maker's viewpoint as it is, is it possible to determine why no intervention has yet occurred?

B. WHY NO INTERVENTION

At least one scholar must be satisfied with his explanation of why the Soviets have failed to intervene. While perhaps not precisely correct in matching today's events, he nevertheless captured the essence when he wrote that of past events,

what really determined whether the Soviets would resort to military intervention against a domestic faction was whether that domestic faction demonstrated to Moscow the capacity to and will to mobilize its country for armed resistance.²³³

The Polish threat to respond to intervention with armed force has been clear both during the recent crises and in preceding ones. Not only has a large group of senior Polish army officers gone on record that it would fight an invading army, but a French poll revealed that 66% of the Poles would also resist.²³⁴ Finally, recent reports indicate that Solidarity is building up defense plans and caching weapons

²³³ Christopher B. Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention," World Politics 29 (January 1977): 217.

²³⁴ Paris Match, 12 November 1980, cited in Christian Science Monitor, 14 November 1980.

to defend the factories.²³⁵ They may also be joining the militia. Soviet perceptions of the direct costs of intervention in casualties and long-term garrison forces must be high. The Poles have manifested their will to meet a Soviet intervention with force clearly and in a variety of ways. One might also wonder, however, if the Polish leaders are not acting in a more sophisticated manner than the Czech predecessors who also strove to avoid triggering Soviet intervention while conducting their own reforms. Finally, it is indeed possible that the Poles are learning to work together. This has been a major factor, both historically and recently, in inhibiting any lengthy peaceful interaction in Poland. Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski has appeared capable, during the spring, of balancing the Soviets, the Party and Solidarity at the same time that Walesa appears to be holding his own balancing the Party and the workers. This very shaky state of affairs may have been sufficient to preclude Soviet intervention thus far.

The absence of Soviet intervention may also be explained by the unique and far-reaching nature of the problem. Since WWII, the world has witnessed Poland experience a series of

²³⁵ U.S. News and World Report, 11 May 1981, p. 21, and Christian Science Monitor, 8 April 1981.

explosions. Each of these have contributed to gradual but increasing differentiation of Poland from the Soviet model.²³⁶ Direct Soviet involvement to halt the current process "would only intensify the Polish resentment (for) the Russians, (and) it would precipitate another, even more bitter, political confrontation in the future."²³⁷ The Polish problem today has been called a "new reality"²³⁸ which transcends Poland itself by portending future change to the Bloc members both individually and collectively. Dmitri Simes succinctly characterized the innappropriate nature of a forceful intervention in Poland as a "desparate solution,"²³⁹ and the Soviets have given one clear signal that acknowledges their acceptance of the fact that the Polish problem is unique. Unlike their reaction to Czechoslovakia, to which they refused any aid in 1968, in 1980, they have given sizeable aid to the Poles, including scarce hard currency reserves.

²³⁶ "A Wider Rubicon than in 1968," Le Monde (Paris), 11 December 1980, in FBIS-WE, 12 December 1980, p. K-2.

²³⁷ Adam Bromke, "Poland at the Crossroads," The World Today 34 (April 1978):156.

²³⁸ Jacek Wejroch, "The Polish Situation from the Viewpoint of the Catholic Intelligentsia," speech given in Polish in January 1981. Translated by Craig Holley.

²³⁹ Time, 1 September 1980, p. 26.

Another explanation for the Soviet failure to react with an intervention thus far may stem from their own nature. Many events, with the notable exception of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, support the view that they act with caution. Jiri Valenta has argued that their decision to move on Czechoslovakia in 1968 came in part because of their perception of the low risks associated with this action.²⁴⁰ More recent evidence has argued the tentative nature of their initial interference in Angola in the mid-seventies. Changing focus slightly, and avoiding the generalization of single word characterizations, Jan F. Triska has argued that the Soviets would generally use force only slowly for two reasons.

- 1) Since 1968, the Soviets have demonstrated sensitivity to the socio-political consequences of a decline of welfare in Eastern Europe which can be "avoided by prudent policies based on established, sensible relations."

²⁴⁰ Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968, Anatomy of a Decision, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 158.

2) The only real military/political allies the Soviets have are the Eastern Europeans who therefore they have a high priority and are worthy of investment.^{2*1}

Roy Medvedev, a member of the Soviet intelligentsia, gives corroboration to this view. He maintains that at the conclusion of the August strikes, the CPSU adopted a long-term strategy which counted on the slow recovery of the preexisting institutions,^{2*2} Further defining Soviet nature, and showing its consistency are comments of one noted Soviet expert made in 1967. The Soviets seek to "reserve the always risky policy of armed force as a last alternative."^{2*3} Another adds that in response to complex situations, Soviet leadership "tries to keep all its options open for as long as possible and to evade, repeatedly, decisions on matters of principle."^{2*4} Another aspect of their nature is evident throughout history. They hesitate to get involved in two places at one time. Their current

^{2*1} Jan P. Triska, "Soviet-East European Relations," in The Soviet Union: Looking to the 1980's, ed. Robert Wesson (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), p. 59.

^{2*2} "Moscow Does Not Fear 'Polish Contagion'," La Stampa (Turin), 28 September 1980, p. 7. in FBIS-USSR, 3 October 1980, Annex.

^{2*3} Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, Unity, and Conflict, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 263.

^{2*4} Mario Soares, "Eurocommunism: Does It Exist?," Atlantic Community Quarterly 16 (Fall 1978):276.

occupation of Afghanistan presents them with this dilemma.²⁴⁵ However, the absence of intervention thus far reflects only a decision to delay it for later consideration. It bears great similarity to the decisions taken in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 when intervention occurred only after long deliberation and much effort to solve the crises by other, more peaceful means.

The Soviet nature is closely tied to their decision making, to which we must also turn to explain their lack of intervention. Vernon Aspaturian has identified four goals of Soviet decision makers. These are

- 1) Security of their territory and population.
- 2) Preservation and enhancement of their power, prestige, and influence.
- 3) Preservation of the social order at home.
- 4) Extension of their ideological values elsewhere.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁵ This author does not by any means wish to convey the impression that their occupation of Afghanistan precludes action in Poland. The Soviets have thus far demonstrated tolerance for the existing military balance in Afghanistan. However, the psychological impact of their involvement is more important than the military requirements this involvement levies on them.

²⁴⁶ Vernon Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 221. Aspaturian adds that when in conflict with each other, security is preeminent over ideological considerations.

In Poland today, we have seen that all four are being tested. They are mutually reinforcing, acting to drive the decision in the same direction, towards intervention. But, in light of the balance of this extended analysis, this direction should not be surprising, it is the decision to avoid intervention so far which we are currently seeking to explain.

Jiri Valenta has presented us with an in-depth analysis of the last Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. It sheds light on our question, because of its value as a yardstick with which we can make estimates of the status of the current Soviet decision making. His paradigm distinguishes as determining factors

- 1) consensus building,
- 2) deadlines, and
- 3) manipulation of the rules.^{2*7}

The absence of a consensus in early December and its effect on their actions at that time have already been noted. The serious challenge made to the Soviets in Afghanistan may also have strengthened the hand of the moderates in the Politburo. Neither has an irrevocable deadline yet passed. The Poles may have been aware of this significance of the

^{2*7} Valenta, Soviet Intervention, p. 155.

Party Congress as an action forcing element when they postponed until July.

It is more difficult to uncover evidence of rule changes. Valenta demonstrated that the boundaries of the group responsible for decision making were altered to affect the outcome of the decision. Since August, perhaps the most striking event has been the retirement of Aleksei Kosygin. But this appears to have been clearly related to his failing health which lead to his death in December rather than to the stand he took on Poland. The only other factor then apparent is the reelection, without a single change, of the entire Politburo at the 26th Party Congress held in February of this year. This tends to indicate great caution and concern on the parts of the most senior Soviet decision makers.

The emphasis on the interplay of various actors within the decision making apparatus highlighted by the bureaucratic politics paradigm, hides another important factor. In 1968, Leonid Brezhnev had only been in power four years and his leadership was still shared, in the familiar Russian troika, with Kosygin and President Nikolai Podgorny. In 1981, Brezhnev has firm and undisputed control of the Politburo. The Soviet leadership is also marked by

greater homogeneity today arising from his appointment, through the years, of many subordinates who are loyal to him. It is also apparent that his health has improved in the last two years. This gives him greater strength with which to exert his influence within that body. These new realities in the Soviet Politburo may help explain their reticence to move on Poland. However, the events of early December indicate that we cannot rely on these or on the tested and failing policy related by Roy Medvedev, to preclude a future decision to intervene.

One final reason is less important but highly illuminating. The lack of Soviet intervention thus far may revolve about the severe difficulties which the Soviets experienced during their mobilization in August during the strikes. One report noted extraordinary confusion and discipline problems.²⁴⁸ A second one was more definitive, noting that the party First Secretary in the Transcarpathian military district lost his job because of the discipline problems which included mass desertions of assembly points and which led to dragooning on the streets of the district. "Severe demoralization" and "sympathy" for the Poles may

²⁴⁸ Washington Post, 13 February 1981.

have stemmed from the reservists' Polish and Czech ethnic backgrounds.²⁴⁹

This one report reveals indisputable proof of the sensitivity of both the western regions to the events occurring in Poland and of the Politburo to its own western problems. In 1968, the same First Secretary of the Transcarpathian Regional Committee, Yuri Il'nitski was used by the Politburo to dramatize the situation in his region.²⁵⁰ In a largely unprecedented maneuver, he was invited to speak in the Politburo. Yet in 1980, it appears that his zealousness in ordering dragooning and the commandeering of automobiles was viewed as potentially destabilizing in the precarious environment. Rather than being called to the Politburo to urge the intervention he obviously wanted, he was removed. Again the thread of Soviet caution and concern emerges.

The Polish threat to respond, the unique nature of the problem, the nature of the Soviets, and their decision making apparatus have combined to thus far limit Soviet initiatives in Poland. However, they can all be overcome by a serious turn of events in Poland. What other responses

²⁴⁹ The Financial Times (London), 13 February 1981.

²⁵⁰ Valenta, Soviet Intervention, p. 60.

could the Soviets make to answer increasing tensions in Poland?

C. ALTERNATIVES TO INTERVENTION

Five alternatives present themselves as possible means to alleviate the need to resort to the forceful use of the Soviet military. The first is to accept the status quo. The Soviets have not yet adopted this approach in its entirety. Their statements and press releases, accompanied by the vitriolic East German and Czech attacks which the Soviets allow, give evidence to their continuing pressure. However, allowing this distinction, Soviet acceptance of the status quo, of Polish renewal within the international communist subsystem, would be a surprise. Although most observers feel that eventual Soviet intervention is almost a certainty, it has been noted that in previous crises situations the Soviets have always surprised the West. Arguments for and against their acceptance of the status quo have been made throughout this analysis.

The second and third alternatives have already been exercised. The second one is administrative intervention.

This occurred in late November and early December of last year.²⁵¹ Its importance as an alternative is very limited. It has two principle roles. In the first, of information collection, it has presumably met with success. In its second, to freeze Polish forces in the event of intervention, no evaluation can be definitive, but it should be regarded as less likely to succeed in view of past experience and Polish determination. The third alternative to intervention is to use maneuvers to strengthen the Party and to intimidate the masses. Jiri Pelikan quotes Vasil Bilak, a Czechoslovak Presidium member, as observing that in 1968, the maneuvers were an "important form of Soviet assistance to the Czechoslovak Communist Party in mobilizing itself and expelling the revisionists."²⁵² This alternative must be viewed as a failure after the March strikes which occurred in the midst of Soviet maneuvers.

A fourth alternative appears to have only the remotest of possibilities. This would be for independent action on the part of Poland's East European neighbors. It seems unlikely because of the small East German armed forces and

²⁵¹ CBS, "Evening News," 9 December 1980, and Washington Star, 18 December 1980.

²⁵² "Moscow Working for a Break," Avanti (Rome), 29-30 March 1981, pp. 1,20, in FBIS-EEU, 8 April 1981, p. G-40.

the extreme Polish sensitivity to them, and the lack of a Czech military tradition.

The last alternative is perhaps more serious than that of Soviet intervention because of its unknown qualities. This alternative would see a civil war break out in Poland. This alternative draws its potential from the state of Poland as revealed in the first chapter and must continue to cause concern. It could be induced by external pressure on the Polish leaders to renege on their agreements with the Polish citizenry. It could also arise from the replacement of the present moderate PUWP leaders with some of the Party's more hardline members. Because its unpredictable nature would unquestionably threaten the Soviet perceptions of their own security, this eventuality would doubtlessly lead directly to Soviet intervention.²⁵³ However, possible alternatives are not necessarily probable ones. It seems unlikely that the Soviets would deliberately set the stage for a civil war. This is far from a cautious approach. International military intervention into a civil war involves too many variables. While it would serve to lower the costs and increase the perceived legitimacy of the

²⁵³ "Two Contradictions of the Polish Crisis," Avanti (Turin), 14-15 December 1980, Culture Supplement, p. v., in FBIS-EE, 29 December 1980, p. D-6.

action, the unquantifiably increased difficulties incumbent in the option would more than offset the benefits gained.

This leads to the conclusion that the Soviets have two practical alternatives. First, to maintain their present course, incorrectly identified as a status quo, and two, to order a military intervention. What developments could be expected to trigger an intervention?

D. WHEN INTERVENTION COMES

Andrzej Korbonski writes "it is virtually impossible to identify a situation that can trigger Soviet armed intervention because it is capable of changing the rules at any time."²⁵ Notwithstanding this gloomy prognosis, we must endeavor to determine which situations may trigger Soviet intervention into Poland within the next year. Many previous triggers have been pulled by the events occurring since last August, but none have yet fired a round. This has rendered a situation in which increasingly higher peaks of tension and increasingly stronger challenges have been backed away from almost without exception. This forces the analyst to

²⁵ Andrzej Korbonski, "Eastern Europe and the Soviet Threat," Academy of Political Science Proceedings 33(No. 1, 1978):68.

work on shaky ground far outside the constraints he has worked within until recently.

The search for a trigger must lead first to the most significant event which has not yet had to have been accepted, the total breakdown of the party's control. This has already been identified as the single fundamental change to occur in Poland since August. Party dissension is continuing to grow and is attracting greater degrees of Soviet attention as the days pass.

The free election of delegates, addressed in Chapter I, is pointing the way towards a general turnover of the cadres which is awesome. There is every possibility that a new Central Committee can be elected which will in turn elect a new Politburo. Finally, Stanislaw Kania stands a surprisingly serious chance of being replaced. This is dramatic but also dangerous for the new leaders who could replace them are not established and will have little experience running the country or dealing with their Soviet and East European neighbors. This peaceful revolution might not, by itself, be unpalatable to the Soviets, but any effort by the current Polish elites to maintain their positions in the face of this wellspring could be the spark in the powder keg. It is inconceivable that intervention

would not be ordered if they should they decide that the party had lost control or that the country was out of control.

The other situation which could foreshadow a Soviet intervention would be a Soviet perception that failure to act would seriously weaken Soviet authority within the region. This perception would bear a direct correlation with the probability of a spillover of the Polish contagion into neighboring countries. But it is not clear that the Soviets would move in Poland to preclude a spillover elsewhere. They might find it advantageous to allow the spillover to occur. They could then follow their own 1956 precedent when intervention in Poland was deferred by a sudden crisis which arose in Hungary. As in the earlier case, this would send an unambiguous signal to the Poles while also reducing many of the unavoidable costs which a Polish intervention would entail.²⁵⁵

Thus far, both Czechoslovakia and the GDR have remained largely insulated from the Polish events, reducing, so far,

²⁵⁵ These incumbent costs include the resistance expected from the large militant population, large territory requiring control, and the central location which jeopardizes the lines of communication to the GDR. More importantly, a move into another country would allow them to overcome the mistake of the deferred action for which they would have to pay in Poland. See James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 162.

this possibility. But this insulation has very little durability. The East Germans have accomplished this by redirecting attention with sharp attacks of West Germany. Hungary continues in a skeptical view and only Yugoslavia still makes comments in its media that renewal of the PUWP is possible. The reality of the problem of remaining isolated from the contagion of freedom is amply evidenced by a recent Romanian defector who told of widespread "awareness and admiration" in her country of the Polish experiment.²⁵⁶ It should be expected that the East Europeans will continue to generally assault the events in Poland and counsel the Soviets for the intervention which the latter are so hesitant to make.

Should the Soviets decide to intervene, their decision would be taken only a few days prior to the operation. Their action would be characterized by three conditions. First, it is clear that they would attempt to pre-deploy as many forces as possible throughout Poland, as they may have been attempting in December when they requested to transit four divisions of troops through Poland to East Germany. Airborne and air mobile forces would also play a major role in the initial stages. Second, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in -----

²⁵⁶ Christian Science Monitor, 8 April 1981.

Afghanistan in 1979, as well as in Manchuria and Berlin in 1945, large numbers of forces would be available. This cost is high, but mass is a principle well-founded in their history and is a key element in their military doctrine. Finally, the move would be attended by a clever deception plan. This is also key to their doctrine.

Neither should the Soviet capability to achieve their objective of quelling the Polish revolution in the short-run be doubted. Seweryn Bialer has offered a very real scenario in which the Soviets withhold food from striking Poles and their families.²⁵⁷ While a Western thinker might wish to feel that this was a totally alien plan, we must remember that the situation which brought it about, Soviet domination of an extranational population, is also alien to our acknowledged thought processes.

In light of these statements, what sort of actions can the West in general and the US in particular, take to militate against Soviet intervention? This author maintains that the decision to prepare, accurately and in a most detailed fashion reported by Representative Les Aspin's

²⁵⁷ Christian Science Monitor, 8 April 1981.

subcommittee in January 1981 is very different from the decision to intervene.²⁵⁸ While the first may levy a constraint on the minimum time required for a prepared Soviet reaction, it should not be confused with the very short-term decision to intervene. Both the events in the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 and those detailed in the December 1980 periods give credence to this observation.

If the decision to act is taken only in the short-term, then effective Western response must become operational in the same time frame. Short of significant military action perceived to be capable of successful completion in the same time period, few alternatives are available. There is some evidence that Western intelligence was transmitted to the Poles during early December, thus further limiting the Soviet ability to gain surprise. This may have been and can be effective in the future. Other options should be developed within the constraints of high cost to the Soviets, of requiring a short-term to operationalize, and of directly challenging the decision we seek to influence. Use of these options should also occur prior to the event they seek to preclude. Only within these constraints can we hope

²⁵⁸ New York Times, 2 January 1981. Report of the House Intelligence Oversight subcommittee entitled, "The Worst is Yet to Come."

to be successful. If we do not develop options matching these constraints, then we will confirm the pessimistic analyses of many scholars whose observations are reflected in the words of Robert W. Tucker. "There are no counter-measures we can credibly propose that would be more than marginally deterrent."²⁵⁹

E. CONCLUSION

The Soviets have many powerful long-term arguments for intervention. Thus far, they have perceived that the short-term arguments to refrain from direct military intervention have been more powerful. The ability of the Poles to successfully bring about the changes which the vast majority of the population supports has been amply revealed by Soviet acquiescence, thus far, of radical change. Acceptance of the reality of Solidarity appears to be genuine. The Soviets have also acknowledged both the similarities of the Polish economic problem in other East European countries and that some renewal of leaders is necessary because mistakes on their part contributed to the problem at hand. But the progress of events in Poland gives every indication that it is only a matter of time before the Poles issue a challenge

²⁵⁹ Robert W. Tucker, "Trading Poland for the Gulf," Harpers, April 1981, p. 18.

that Soviets will not be able to overlook. If intervention occurs, it will be because the Poles failed to properly conduct their quest. But this quest is terribly difficult. No less a philosopher than Montesquieu has noted that political authority in the state begins to be eroded from the moment its principles of legitimacy begin to be questioned. The history of this crisis has revealed an eight to ten week cycle of quiet and tension. The last ended in early April. As this is written, the next period is almost upon us, and the deadline of the Party Congress approaches. Thus, we too, should heed the words of Jozef Lenart, a member of the Czech Central Committee Presidium. "It is of supreme importance to remain vigilant"²⁶⁰ to the continuing and growing threat to Poland today.

²⁶⁰ "Working Class Vanguard," Pravda (Moscow), 20 February 1981, p. 4, in FBIS-USSR, 24 February 1981, p. F-4.

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
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